Responding Under Pressure: Lessons from MOPAN Assessments on Organisational Adaptation to Reform and Funding Constraints

Scaling up common services, integrating global supply chains, and coordinating procurement of key items across the humanitarian system, particularly among UN entities, are key priorities of current reform agendas, particularly of the New Humanitarian Compact of the UN80 Initiative. A further source of efficiency is mutual recognition, defined as the ability of one UN entity to rely on another entity’s policies, procedures, systems, contracts and related operational mechanisms to implement activities without requiring additional evaluation or approval ​(Joint Inspection Unit, 2024[37])​. 

MOPAN evidence shows that these arrangements have the potential to reduce duplication, lower administrative costs, and enable faster, more efficient responses ​(MOPAN, 2025[25])​. However, their effectiveness depends on consistent implementation across MOs and sufficient resources to sustain shared platforms, services, and operational capacities on which other entities rely. At country level, progress in scaling up shared services has been remained slow, with implementation falling short of agreed targets, thus limiting the anticipated efficiency gains and savings ​(MOPAN, 2025, p. 19[25])​.

UNDP plays an important role as a provider of common operational and back-office services across the UN system. Through its Global Shared Services Centre and Quantum platform, it provides services including human resources administration, payroll and finance to other UN entities, while also participating in the Global Shared Services Task Team (MOPAN, UNDP Technical Annex, 2026, p.11). UNDP reports on progress related to mutual recognition, although monitoring of mutual recognition remains limited system-wide (MOPAN, UNDP Technical Annex, 2026, p.37). 

UNICEF was an early adopter of the UN development system’s mutual recognition principle, under which UN entities accept one another’s processes and systems in areas such as finance, procurement, logistics, information technology, administration, and human resources. This has enabled UNICEF to collaborate with UNOPS and WHO on joint procurement, including vaccines, while its Global Shared Services Centre has participated in system-wide discussions on extending administrative services to other UN entities (MOPAN, UNICEF Assessment Report, 2021, p. 49).

WFP provides some of the humanitarian system’s most extensive shared logistics and supply-chain services (MOPAN, WFP Assessment Report, 2024, p.58). Through the Logistics Cluster, the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, and the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot, WFP provides operational access, storage, and global transport for humanitarian and development organisations. During COVID-19, it also supported WHO procurement by transporting personal protective equipment and respiratory supplies to 56 countries and acted as a provider of last resort for other agencies. These services offer significant system-wide capacity but generate substantial recurrent costs, as illustrated by rising requirements for UNHAS and UNHRD (MOPAN, WFP Technical Annex, 2024, p.127). Furthermore, since 2022, the WFP and UNCHR have provided light vehicle leasing services to UN entities through the United Nations Fleet, which counts more than 30,000 vehicles (MOPAN, Technical Annex, 2024, p.64).

Shared services also illustrate that efficiency gains also need to be considered at the system level, not only in terms of expenditure by individual agencies. Such arrangements are closer to adaptation by design when their implementation is consistent across MOs and the shared platforms, services, and operational capacities on which other MOs depend are adequately resourced and sustained.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Nexus, adopted in 2019, calls for greater coherence among humanitarian, development, and peace actors operating in the same contexts. This objective has become increasingly urgent as crises become protracted and humanitarian organisations remain locked in long-term service delivery that cannot be sustained through scarce humanitarian financing alone. The Humanitarian Reset also emphasises the importance of achieving closer collaboration with development actors and IFIs to strengthen resilience and addressing the drivers of fragility ​(IASC, 2025[13])​. This implies a clear understanding of the comparative advantage of each type of actor and a well-defined, complementary division of labour. While some MOs have expanded their programming to bridge humanitarian and development interventions, others have made deliberate choices to refocus their action where they can achieve the greatest impact.

MOPAN evidence shows that while several MOs have made significant progress in incorporating the HDP Nexus into their corporate policies and guidance, the implementation at the field level remains limited. Operationalisation of the Nexus is constrained in particular by fragmented and insufficiently coordinated humanitarian, development, and peace funding streams, limited expertise and understanding of role complementarity among MO staff, and the absence of appropriate transition and hand-over mechanisms.

Following its financial crisis of 2022-23, the ICRC decided to focus on protection in active conflict situations and deprioritise humanitarian-development nexus activities in contexts where needs have evolved towards recovery and resilience. The MOPAN assessment found that this strategic choice was motivated by the recognition that ICRC’s comparative advantage lies primarily in the acute conflict phase, and that other actors are better placed to lead once emergencies stabilise, though the extent to which ICRC has been able to facilitate transition varies across contexts (MOPAN, ICRC Assessment Report, 2026, p.40, 48). 

The MOPAN assessment describes how WFP had expanded its resilience and development work to further advance both its priorities of ‘saving lives’ (i.e., meeting immediate humanitarian needs) and ‘changing lives’ (i.e., reducing vulnerability and future humanitarian need by addressing the root causes of hunger). The MOPAN assessment highlights that, while ‘changing lives’ work is important for WFP’s engagement across the HDP Nexus and for resource mobilisation, it also carries a risk of competition and mandate overlap with other agencies (MOPAN, WFP Technical Annex, 2024, p.7). WFP integrated the HDP Nexus in its 2022-25 Strategic Plan and increasingly aimed to operationalise it through Country Strategic Plans, increased resilience programming, and a conflict sensitivity-mainstreaming strategy. Implementation nevertheless varied across countries and remained dependent on available funding, while reductions at HQ and donor pressure to refocus WFP on its humanitarian role risked weakening its programming in the development pillar of the Nexus (MOPAN, WFP Technical Annex, 2024, p.159, 162,164).

UNHCR developed an internal Strategic Plan on Engaging with Development Actors and expanded its partnership with the World Bank to promote the inclusion, resilience, and self-reliance of refugees and host communities. However, greater engagement had not consistently allowed UNHCR to transfer long-term service delivery responsibilities or establish clear ‘hand-over’ procedures from humanitarian assistance in protracted displacement situations (MOPAN, UNHCR Technical Annex, 2024, p.85). A 2021 independent evaluation commissioned by UNHCR found that, despite clear progress, UNHCR’s humanitarian-development approach remained constrained by the incomplete internal mainstreaming of the Nexus, planning and financing systems that encouraged short-term approaches, and the absence of clear benchmarks or incentives for staff to transition out of direct service provision, particularly as staff perceived that an expanded or maintained UNHCR presence was rewarded​ (Steets and Lehmann, 2021[38])​.

IOM’s commitment to the HDP Nexus was reflected in its Strategic Vision, Strategic Results Framework and Migration and Sustainable Development Strategy. In 2021, as part of a HQ restructuring process, IOM established the Department for Peace and Development Co-ordination was created and appointed a Special Adviser, whose main task is to ensure that IOM coordinates effectively with other entities under the umbrella of the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) (MOPAN, IOM Assessment Report, 2023, p.46). Nonetheless, the MOPAN assessment found that field-level implementation remained constrained by IOM’s reliance on short-term project funds, competing donor priorities, lack of knowledge management systems, capacity constraints among national and local counterparts, and insecure operating context. In 2020, IOM developed an Integrating Conflict Sensitivity Operational Guide and an accompanying Standardized Guidance on Conflict Analysis. However, the assessment found that implementation of these tools was fragmented and unsystematic (MOPAN, IOM Assessment Report, 2023, p.47).

UNICEF had substantial corporate guidance for linking humanitarian and development programming, but the MOPAN assessment found that country teams lacked sufficient direction on UNICEF’s comparative advantage and complementarity with partners across different crisis contexts (MOPAN, UNICEF Technical Annex, 2021, p.158).

Implementing the HDP Nexus is closer to adaptation by design where MOs embed it in organisational strategies and country-level practice, clarify their comparative advantage, and establish clear roles and transition arrangements with other actors. It risks becoming adaptation by attrition where funding pressures lead to retrenchment without adequate planning, financing, partner capacity or hand-over arrangements.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are not core humanitarian actors and cannot substitute for humanitarian organisations in delivering rapid, needs-based assistance. Their contribution in crisis and fragile contexts lies in financing the public systems and services on which affected populations depend, sustaining and/or expanding essential expenditure and social protection, and supporting national preparedness, resilience and reconstruction. Across MOPAN assessments, this role is found to be constrained by longer response timelines, conservative risk profiles, resource allocation rules that can limit access to grants or concessional finance, particularly for middle-income countries, and business models centred on government counterparts. MOPAN assessments point to considerable variation in how far specific approaches to crisis and fragility are institutionalised across MDBs, as well as recurring challenges around the flexibility and accessibility of financing instruments, operational capacity and partnerships, and the measurement of results in fragile and crisis-affected settings.

MOPAN evidence presents significant differences across MDBs in the extent to which crisis and fragility considerations are embedded in their institutional frameworks and operations. The World Bank is the MDB where approaches to working in situations of fragility are most institutionalised. Its 2020–25 Fragility, Conflict and Violence Strategy2 established a basis for remaining engaged during crises and conflict, supported by Risk and Resilience Assessments, a central team of fragility specialists and dedicated financing windows (MOPAN, World Bank Assessment Report, 2023, pp. 52–53). A subsequent evaluation nevertheless found that strategic commitments were not always translated consistently into country programming and that increased financial commitments were not matched by proportionate administrative budgets and staffing ​(World Bank, 2025[39])​. 

The African Development Bank (AfDB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) have also strengthened their institutional approaches. The AfDB’s Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2022–26 is supported by standardised Country Resilience and Fragility Assessments and increased staff presence in fragile settings (MOPAN, African Development Bank Assessment Report, 2023, p. 37). The ADB’s 2021 FCAS and SIDS Approach introduced Fragility and Resilience Assessments and expanded specialist support to country teams. However, MOPAN found that Country Partnership Strategies (CPS) remained relatively generic and that limited country presence and human resources constraints within the Fragility Team hampered implementation (MOPAN, Asian Development Bank Assessment Report, 2025, p. 65). 

Other MDBs often lack both a clear approach to defining fragility and a well-defined role in conflict and crisis settings. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is a case in point. MOPAN found that it responded with considerable agility to Covid-19, the war in Ukraine and the 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye, using streamlined approvals, advisory support and crisis-specific frameworks (MOPAN European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Assessment Report, 2024, p. 43, 48, 55). A subsequent evaluation of EBRD’s 2021-25 Strategic and Capital Framework found that this agility was not always matched by institutional preparedness: existing processes for monitoring, reporting and disbursement were not fully suited to the scale and speed of the Ukraine response, while the Bank lacked an established crisis-response mechanism and clear internal prioritisation between immediate needs and longer-term objectives3​ (EBRD, 2025[40])​. The evaluation called for a more consistent approach to crises and fragility, stronger operational preparedness, and for results systems better able to capture the impact of crisis interventions​ (EBRD, 2025[40])​.

MDBs bring a range of financing instruments to crisis contexts, including policy-based lending, emergency and contingent financing, concessional and grant financing, dedicated disaster- and crisis-response facilities, and risk-sharing instruments. These instruments can operate at scale, sustain public services, and connect crisis response with longer-term recovery. However, they generally work through governments and public institutions and therefore complement rather than replace humanitarian action.

The World Bank’s dedicated instruments include the IDA FCV envelope, the Window for Host Communities and Refugees, the State and Peacebuilding Fund and the Global Concessional Financing Facility (MOPAN World Bank Assessment Report, 2023, pp. 52–53). The ADB uses its Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy, Contingent Disaster Financing, Asian Development Fund crisis-response windows and the Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund (MOPAN Asian Development Bank Assessment Report, 2025, p. 75). Evaluations have generally found these mechanisms timely and broadly effective, while identifying weaknesses in monitoring and livelihood rehabilitation ​(Asian Development Bank, 2025[41])​ ​(Asian Development Bank, 2023[42])​​ (Asian Development Bank, 2012[43])​.

The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) stands out among MDBs both because all its Borrowing Member Countries are Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and because it can channel concessional resources across income categories, including to middle- and high-income countries. This enables it to respond to the particular vulnerability of SIDS, including to climate-related shocks and disasters, in contexts where income-based eligibility rules would normally restrict access to concessional finance (MOPAN, Caribbean Development Bank Main Report, 2026, p.11, 22). However, MOPAN found that some CDB instruments were hindered by procedural rigidity, limited scope to restructure projects and insufficient adaptive management (MOPAN, Caribbean Development Bank Assessment Report, 2026, p. 72). 

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) relaxed disbursement restrictions and increased policy-based lending during COVID-19, allowing it to provide liquidity more quickly, although at some cost to other priorities, including climate finance (MOPAN Inter-American Development Bank Assessment Report, 2023, p. 27, 37). Other examples of rapid adaptation include the AfDB’s USD 1.5 billion Africa Emergency Food Production Facility and the EBRD’s use of credit lines and risk-sharing arrangements ​(African Development Bank, 2023[44])​ (MOPAN, EBRD Assessment Report, 2024, p.15). These mechanisms can help MDBs mobilise additional resources and respond to emerging needs, but they also require strong internal systems for donor engagement, implementation, and monitoring. The EBRD experience, in particular, shows that innovation in financial instruments needs to be matched by adequate institutional capacity: the rapid expansion of donor financing and use of relatively new instruments, such as unfunded guarantees, required changes to internal processes and organisational arrangements and placed additional demands on coordination, portfolio management, and monitoring systems ​(EBRD, 2025, p. 27[40])​.

Across MOPAN assessments, delivery constraints extend beyond finance. MDBs increasingly seek to place staff in fragile settings, but recruitment, retention, and specialist capacity remain difficult. For some MDBs, capacity support can often remain fragmented and project-specific rather than providing the sustained institutional strengthening, which is needed in capacity-constrained contexts. The CDB assessment, for instance, identifies a need for a more strategic, longer-term, and programmatic approach to technical assistance and institutional strengthening (MOPAN, Caribbean Development Bank Assessment Report, 2026, pp. 74, 76). This can result in fragmented interventions that address immediate project requirements without strengthening the broader institutions and systems needed to manage continuing risks.

Partnerships with other development and humanitarian actors are particularly important in fragile and crisis-affected settings, where MDBs may depend on partners for access, implementation capacity, and context-specific knowledge. The World Bank’s partnership with the UN stands out as it is comparatively institutionalised through the Framework for Partnership in Crisis-Affected Situations, which since 2017 has been implemented through joint analysis, operational collaboration and advocacy in fragile and crisis-affected settings ​(World Bank, 2023[45])​ . The MOPAN  assessment of the World Bank also points to instances of  effective collaboration, as in the case of the World Bank’s work with UNHCR (see section 5.1), but it also identifies occasional sources of tension with humanitarian actors, arising from the Bank’s practice of working with governments party to armed conflict and also from the implementation of strict environmental, social, security, and fiduciary safeguarding policies (MOPAN, World Bank Assessment Report, 2023, p.76), ​(World Bank, 2021, p. 73[46])​. MOPAN found that CDB engages in joint mechanisms with other IFIs and development partners to promote harmonisation, knowledge sharing, and common standards, but these arrangements are not yet applied consistently across country strategies and operations (MOPAN, Caribbean Development Bank Assessment Report, p. 76).

For some MDBs, results measurement remains a challenge in crisis and fragile contexts. The CDB assessment found that results reporting remained heavily focused on outputs and ex ante projections, with limited measurement of institutional or behavioural change, while EBRD’s independent evaluation found that crisis-response results were measured largely through input and activity indicators and did not adequately capture the effects of interventions (MOPAN, Caribbean Development Bank Assessment Report, 2026, p. 80)​ (EBRD, 2025, p. 20[40])​.