Responding Under Pressure: Lessons from MOPAN Assessments on Organisational Adaptation to Reform and Funding Constraints

The humanitarian system entered 2026 following an exceptional contraction in levels of international aid. Preliminary OECD data indicate that official development assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee countries and associates fell by 23.1% in real terms in 2025, to USD 174.3 billion. This was the largest annual contraction in the history of ODA and followed an earlier decline in 2024, with cuts by France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States accounting for 96% of the total decline. Multilateral ODA also fell for the second consecutive year, including a 27% reduction in core contributions to the UN system​ (OECD, 2026[3])​.

International humanitarian assistance has declined for three consecutive years, reversing a previous longer-term expansion in humanitarian financing. This decline began modestly in 2023, when a reduction in private contributions from their 2022 peak outweighed the growth in public humanitarian ODA. The contraction then worsened significantly in 2024 and 2025: humanitarian assistance fell by 29.7% over these two years, from USD 47.4 billion in 2023 to USD 33.3 billion in 2025. The sharpest reduction took place in 2025, when funding fell by 20%, or USD 8.1 billion compared to 2024 levels. Total international humanitarian assistance has now returned to 2017 levels. The US and Germany accounted for 88% of the reduction in 2025, with changes among other donors, including increased contributions from some Gulf states, also reshaping the composition of the funding base by reducing the weight of OECD-DAC donors​ (ALNAP, 2026[1])​.

It is worth noting that since December 2025 the US has begun to channel large allocations, so called ‘macro awards’, to OCHA-managed pooled funds and selected UN agencies, thus slowing the downward trend in humanitarian funding. In December 2025, the US pledged USD 1.9 billion to OCHA Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), followed by an additional USD 1.8 billion allocation in May 2026​ (State, 2026[10])​. In June 2026, the US State Department announced a USD 1 billion macro award to UNICEF and WFP​ (U.S. Department of State, 2026[11])​, followed by a USD 200 million allocation to the ICRC and the IFRC in July 2026 ​(U.S. Department of State, 2026[12])​. While US humanitarian funding has shrunk overall, the scale of its new allocations to OCHA-managed pooled funds make it one of their largest contributors.

These financial trends are evolving at the same time as ambitious and partly overlapping reform agendas are launched and pursued across the system. The IASC-wide Humanitarian Reset seeks to refocus the broader humanitarian system on saving lives, simplifying coordination and planning, strengthening leadership and accountability at the local level, and shift greater power and resources to local actors. The Reset is organised around four priority areas: Define, concentrating efforts on the most severe needs through prioritisation; Deliver, making coordination and operations lighter and more responsive to the needs of people affected by crises; Devolve, strengthening locally led action; and Defend, protecting humanitarian principles and advocating for unrestrained humanitarian access. These priority actions are supported by enablers stemming from partnerships, especially with IFIs and development actors, quality funding from donors, increased efficiency, data and innovation ​(IASC, 2025[13])​. 

Within the UN system, the New Humanitarian Compact (work package 2, workstream 3 Shifting Paradigms, UN80 Initiative) emphasises shorter and more prioritised Humanitarian Response Plans, pushes for integrated supply chains, expanded common services, and greater interoperability of humanitarian data systems, as well as for more coordinated humanitarian diplomacy and sharper division of roles among UN entities with a humanitarian mandate. The Compact and the Reset are closely connected and some priority actions are implemented jointly, but have a different scope, with the Compact focusing exclusively on UN entities, while the Reset applies to the wider humanitarian system.

Alongside these humanitarian reform agendas, multilateral development banks (MDBs) continue to adapt their approaches to fragility, as demonstrated by the World Bank’s latest 2026-2030 strategy placing job creation at the centre of its engagement in settings affected by fragility, conflict, and violence​ (World Bank Group, 2026[14])​.

While the simultaneous occurrence of both severe reductions in levels of international humanitarian assistance and system-wide reforms is unprecedented in scale and scope, MOs have experienced resource constraints and reform pressures well before 2025.

In terms of financial pressures, while since the mid-2010s, funding for UN-coordinated humanitarian appeals increased significantly from just over USD 10 billion in 2014 to more than USD 30 billion in 2022, it has been outpaced by the rapid escalation of humanitarian needs and associated funding requirements, which has led to a widening humanitarian financing gap. Between 2014 and 2023 the share of humanitarian requirements met fell from 62% to 45%, leaving a USD 31.5 billion funding gap in 2023​ (Rieger et al., 2024, p. 16[4])​. 

The exceptional contributions received in 2021 and 2022 to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and other large emergencies subsequently fell in 2023 towards or below pre-pandemic levels, while needs and delivery costs remained elevated. WFP, for example, received record contribution revenue of US$14.1 billion in 2022, before experiencing a sharp decline in subsequent years ​(WFP, 2023[14])​. At the same time, higher food, fuel, transport and procurement costs reduced the volume of assistance that could be delivered with a given level of funding. In addition, a few MOs, such as WFP and the ICRC, also faced organisation-specific financial crises that resulted in significant funding contractions, distinct from broader system-wide trends.

Many humanitarian MOs were already heavily dependent on voluntary, short-term and earmarked contributions well before 2025​ (Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 2025[15])​. Dependence on a small number of donors left MOs sensitive to changes in donor priorities, while tightly earmarked funding limited their ability to transfer resources between operations, invest in core capabilities, or pursue strategic priorities that did not attract project-specific financing. A 2017 Joint Inspection Unit review of donor reporting requirements across the UN system found that voluntary contributions, most of them earmarked, accounted for approximately 70% of UN system revenue in 2015. It also identified a proliferation of donor-specific programme and financial reporting requirements in addition to organisations’ established corporate and governing-body reporting​ (Joint Inspection Unit, 2017[16])​. 

At the same time, MOs faced pressure to reform and change how humanitarian assistance was delivered. Since its launch following the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, the Grand Bargain has called on both donors and humanitarian MOs to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and direct a greater share of resources towards people in need. In its successive iterations, the Grand Bargain has promoted and emphasised more flexible and predictable funding, cash-based assistance, systematic localisation, and stronger participation and accountability mechanisms for crisis-affected people​ (IASC, 2026[17])​. Beyond the Grand Bargain, over the last decade, the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus and issues such as anticipatory action were also at the forefront of discussions around the role and responsibilities of multilateral organisations operating in crisis settings.

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) were also strengthening their engagement in fragile and crisis-affected contexts as development rather than core humanitarian actors, seeking to preserve hard-won development gains during protracted crises, address underlying drivers of fragility and strengthen partnerships across the HDP Nexus ​(World Bank Group, 2020[18])​.

Further demands for change and increased accountability in the humanitarian system arose following incidents of aid diversion, weaknesses in oversight and cases of sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment. These instances included the diversion of humanitarian assistance in Yemen, Ethiopia, and Somalia​ (WFP, 2019[19])​, as well as safeguarding scandals involving both multilateral organisations and major INGOs, from abuses documented in West Africa in the early 2000s, to subsequent failures exposed during the Ebola response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)​ (International Development Committee, 2018[20])​​ (Independent Commission, 2021[21])​. In addition, pressure to demonstrate value for money and provide performance-based reporting also increased as donors faced tighter domestic budgets and greater scrutiny concerning the use of multilateral contributions ​(International Development Committee, 2025[22])​. 

What distinguishes the period since 2025 is the speed and depth of the funding contraction, which has in turn intensified and accelerated demands for reform. MOs today are being asked to undertake transformation whilst reducing programmes, staffing and operational footprint to absorb unprecedented funding cuts. Past MOPAN assessments can shed light on how MOs responded when confronted with earlier versions of the same underlying tensions, and how these adaptations impacted organisational effectiveness.