Responding Under Pressure: Lessons from MOPAN Assessments on Organisational Adaptation to Reform and Funding Constraints

MOs have responded to reform pressures by adopting delivery modalities that give affected people greater choice and by investing in approaches intended to act before crises escalate. MOPAN evidence shows that cash assistance, a central commitment of both the Grand Bargain and a key theme under the Deliver pillar of the Humanitarian Reset, improves organisational cost-efficiency thanks to reduced transaction and delivery costs ​(MOPAN, 2025, p. 30[25])​.

Some MOs have strengthened preparedness capacities through early-warning systems, contingency planning, pre-positioned supplies, and dedicated financing mechanisms, with some organisations promoting and supporting preparedness across the system, through information sharing and partner capacity building.  MOs have also integrated anticipatory action in their frameworks, systems, and programming. However, the implementation of these delivery modalities has often lagged behind organisational ambition, as a result of competing internal priorities, organisational bottlenecks, and insufficient funding. Aid flows remain weighted towards crisis response, with resources for disaster prevention and preparedness being limited to only 2% of total ODA between 2019 and 2023​ (UNDRR, 2025[28])​. 

Some MOs assessed by MOPAN had increased their use of cash assistance, such as UNDP and WFP.  MOPAN found that WFP’s shift from food assistance towards cash and vouchers offered substantial potential for value for money gains (MOPAN, WFP Technical Annex, 2024, p.90). During the COVID-19 pandemic, WFP also expanded remote-management systems and technology-enabled transfers to maintain delivery where physical access was restricted, although limited digital access risked excluding some vulnerable groups. However, in 2023 a significant proportion of staff time and resources were redirected from the Cash-Based Transfer Division to the Global Assurance Project (see section 3.4). Following the restructuring, in 2024 the Division was dissolved and responsibilities distributed among three different divisions, requiring a cross-departmental working group to ensure coordination and policy coherence ​(WFP Executive Board, 2024[29])​.

FAO expanded its Cash+ approach, which combines cash or vouchers with productive inputs, technical assistance, or training​ (Maeda and Oca Rojo, 2017[30])​. While the evaluations reviewed by MOPAN identified important benefits, procurement and implementation delays continued to affect the timeliness of transfers and accompanying inputs, compounded by the absence of systematic monitoring against seasonal calendars (MOPAN, FAO Technical Annex, 2024, p.165).

Some MOs have strengthened their readiness to respond to future crises through risk monitoring and the strengthening of early-warning systems, enhanced contingency planning and pre-positioned supplies. UNHCR’s strong emergency response functions were further strengthened with the 2023 Policy on Emergency Preparedness and Response, which established clear emergency levels, decision-making responsibilities and actions, supported by risk monitoring and pre-positioned stocks (MOPAN, UNHCR Assessment Report, 2024, p.58). At the time of the assessment, IOM was still at an early stage in developing an organisation-wide early-warning approach, but did undertake contingency planning in emergency and protracted crisis settings (MOPAN, IOM Technical Annex, 2023, p.66, 76). The organisation developed an Emergency Preparedness guidance in 2020 and is also equipped with an Emergency Preparedness Dashboard covering risks and readiness across 70 countries, supported by regional emergency focal points and context-specific early-warning systems (MOPAN, IOM Technical Annex, 2023, p.76). 

Some MOs support and facilitate emergency preparedness across the system. In 2023, UNDP provided crisis-risk dashboards to 50 UN country teams, supporting analysis, early-warning systems, and risk-aware programming (MOPAN, UNDP Technical Annex, p.95). Similarly, WHO has supported national Health ministries in strengthening their health emergency preparedness capacities through dedicated guidance and capacity building (MOPAN, WHO Technical Annex, 2024, p. 62-63). 

Some MOs have also identified anticipatory action as a corporate priority and integrated it into organizational frameworks and programming. UNCHR incorporated anticipatory action into COMPASS, its results-based planning and reporting framework (MOPAN, UNHCR Assessment Report 2024, p.35). WFP has increasingly used climate-risk insurance and other anticipatory instruments, such as cash combined with early-warning messaging, with evaluation evidence pointing to gains in timeliness and scale ​(WFP, 2025[31])​ (MOPAN, WFP Technical Annex, 2024, p.135). 

OCHA upgraded anticipatory action as a corporate priority and introduced strategic steers for CERF. Indeed, CERF has evolved since 2019 from a primarily rapid-response funding mechanism, its core function that it continues to maintain, into being the leading contributor to anticipatory action globally, increasingly using forecasts, pre-agreed triggers, and pre-arranged financing to enable earlier, more proactive humanitarian responses ​(OCHA, 2025[32])​. However, these changes were not embedded through a formal strategy review, contributing to uncertainty and limited buy-in, while its support to national preparedness frameworks remained largely demand-driven rather than systematic (MOPAN, OCHA Assessment Report, 2021, p.72, 111). In IOM’s case, MOPAN found that the absence of a dedicated funding instrument or sufficient reserves limited its capacity to translate warnings into timely anticipatory responses (MOPAN, IOM Assessment Report, 2023, p.44). 

Introducing or strengthening delivery modalities such as cash assistance, preparedness and anticipatory action was closer to adaptation by design where these approaches were embedded in corporate systems, supported by dedicated expertise and financing, and monitored for timeliness, inclusion, and results. Redirected staff capacity or absent financing left implementation partial and limited the intended effectiveness gains.

Among the reforms shaping humanitarian action, localisation is potentially one of the most consequential, given its implications not only for how assistance is delivered, but also for how power and resources are distributed and, ultimately, for the fairness and effectiveness of humanitarian action. Advancing localisation by strengthening the leadership, capacities, and resources available to local and national actors is a central theme to the Humanitarian Reset’s Devolve priority. The localisation agenda, however, predates the Reset, as, since 2016, the Grand Bargain has called for greater support to local responders and for a larger share of humanitarian funding to reach them directly. Localisation aims to shift decision-making, resources, and delivery closer to affected populations and to local and national actors – including local and national NGOs and civil society organisations, national and local authorities, Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies, and affected communities - thereby making humanitarian action more accountable and effective​ (Grand Bargain, 2016[33])​. Recent funding cuts have added urgency to the localisation agenda, at a time when MOs aim to reduce costs by scaling back their operational presence. Yet, despite the long-standing commitments and the more recent financial pressures creating incentives for change, localisation has struggled to gain traction at scale. At the system level, localisation remained underfunded well before the 2025 contraction in humanitarian ODA. In 2024, less than 10% of international humanitarian funding reached local and national actors directly or indirectly, while only 3.8% was provided directly, far below the Grand Bargain target of 25%​ (Pearson and Rieger, 2026[34])​. Nor is it an automatic response to funding cuts: while reducing MOs’ operational footprints may create incentives to work more through local actors, meaningful localisation requires investment in local capacities and flexible financing, which are themselves under pressures when resources contract.

MOPAN evidence illustrates that some MOs have made progress in expanding local partnerships, financing and capacity support. However, progress remains uneven. Localisation is more successful where MOs are able and willing to combine flexible financing, capacity building, and meaningful local participation in decision-making. It remains limited where MOs, or their donors, prefer direct implementation and local actors receive few opportunities for capacity building, while facing heavy compliance requirements or bearing a disproportionate share of the risk. 

UNFPA provides one of the clearest examples of increased direct financing: in 2023, it channelled 34.9% of its humanitarian funding, approximately USD141.5 million, to 360 local and national actors, exceeding the Grand Bargain target of 25% (MOPAN, UNFPA Assessment Report, 2025, p.34). UNHCR had focused strongly on supporting refugee-led organisations through dedicated guidance, more flexible grant arrangements, advisory structures and the Refugee-Led Innovation Fund. It had also sought to strengthen national response capacities and avoid creating parallel systems, although in some protracted crises refugee-specific arrangements can remain distinct from national services, which might limit long-term inclusion and self-reliance outcomes (MOPAN, UNHCR Technical Annex, 2024, p.85, 91). MOPAN found that UNHCR had expanded engagement with local partners through structured partnership frameworks and localisation commitments embedded in its strategic planning, coupled with internal tools, such as a Localisation Checklist and a guide titled “Localization in UNHCR-Led Coordination Structures”, to guide staff in the inclusion of local and displaced/refugee-led organisations (MOPAN, UNCHR, Technical Annex, p.92).  While principles for sharing risk are not mentioned in the Localisation Checklist document, UNHCR often coordinates with local partners to jointly identify and manage risk (MOPAN, UNCHR, Technical Annex, p.92). However, the MOPAN assessment found that some NGOs at country level felt that UNHCR treated them less as partners and more as contractors, with little opportunity for input in project design, heavy monitoring and reporting requirements, and short and frequently renegotiated funding envelopes (MOPAN, UNHCR Technical Annex, 2024, p.88).

OCHA had advanced localisation mainly by increasing national actors’ participation in humanitarian coordination and expanding their access to financing through its pooled funds. Country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) and CERF have incorporated mechanisms to promote funding being channeled to national and local organisations and can serve as an intermediary for donors unable to fund them directly (MOPAN, OCHA Main Report, 2021, p. 41). However, these efforts were not anchored in a clear organisation-wide strategy, specific indicators, or systematic assessment of national capacities (MOPAN, OCHA Main Report, 2021, p.38, 47, 48, 64). Local participation in fund governance and access to capacity support varied across localities, while alignment with national actors outside conflict settings depended heavily on individual country-office leadership (MOPAN, OCHA Main Report, 2021, p. 41, 48).  

IOM is committed to localisation in principle, but its predominantly direct-delivery model and reliance on short-term funding limits its ability to strengthen the role and financing of local partners. At the time of the MOPAN assessment, IOM had opted out of the Grand Bargain commitment to spending at least 25% of its resources through local partners, with only around 5% of its budget channeled through national civil society organisations and governments (MOPAN, IOM Main Report, 2023, p.47, 60). Due to its predisposition for direct delivery, IOM also does not adequately fund and support the capacity building of local and national organisations (MOPAN, IOM Main Report, 2023, p. 60). MOPAN had a similar finding for UNICEF, although working through local organisations, did not consistently prioritise capacity building of its local partners (MOPAN, UNICEF Technical Annex, 2021, p.157).

Localisation efforts are closer to adaptation by design where local actors receive meaningful decision-making authority, adequate and flexible financing, capacity support and appropriate institutional cost-recovery. It risks becoming adaptation by attrition where MOs reduce their own presence and direct delivery role, as a rapid cost-cutting measure, while passing implementation responsibilities, compliance burdens and operational risks to local partners without commensurate resources or influence.

Accountability to affected people (AAP) requires humanitarian actors to use their power responsibly and to place vulnerable and crisis-affected people at the centre of humanitarian action. It is a key component of the Humanitarian Reset’s Deliver pillar and is intended to improve the relevance, effectiveness, and dignity of humanitarian assistance by enabling affected individuals to access information and provide feedback and complaints safely.

MOPAN evidence suggests that several MOs have increasingly embedded AAP and the inclusion of marginalised groups in organisation-wide policies, programme requirements, and staff guidance. Implementation remains uneven, particularly at field level: resource constraints can limit staff training, monitoring, and the operation of accessible feedback mechanisms, while earmarked funding restricts MO’s ability to adapt assistance in response to the inputs provided by affected populations ​(ALNAP, 2025[35])​. MOPAN evidence suggests that MOs need to complement corporate guidance with sustained field-level capacity and also maintain strong and inclusive feedback mechanisms to ensure that the voices of those affected by crisis are heard and acted upon ​(MOPAN, 2022[8])​.

UN Women’s corporate policies and practices set a clear standard for accountability to beneficiary populations, although there is no single corporate statement on AAP. Accountability to beneficiaries is operationalised through a comprehensive system of guidance and procedures designed to ensure that beneficiaries are actively engaged, that their needs are addressed, and their voices are heard in programme design and implementation. The organisation also provides extensive training sessions to both staff and partners aimed at strengthening accountability to beneficiaries across all regions (MOPAN, UN Women Assessment Report, 2025, p.57).

UNICEF adopted its first organisation-wide AAP strategy in 2018 and, in the following years, it developed a corporate handbook, a toolkit, and training sessions to help staff and partners integrate AAP in programme implementation. The MOPAN assessment found that implementation gaps remain related to community engagement and feedback and complaint mechanisms, which UNICEF was addressing through the adoption of digital technologies to facilitate monitoring and ensure compliance (MOPAN, UNICEF Assessment Report, 2021, p.60-61; MOPAN, UNICEF Technical Annex, 2021, p. 130-131). 

UN-Habitat had developed strong consultation and project-approval mechanisms that emphasise inclusion and accountability, including in its work on housing, land and urban responses in humanitarian settings. However, incomplete staff development, weak indicator monitoring and limited investment in reporting and learning constrains the MO’s ability to demonstrate systematic implementation and results (MOPAN, UN-Habitat Assessment Report, 2024, p.50).

An independent evaluation found that OCHA had made progress in integrating AAP into its coordination, funding, and guidance functions, but affected people’s priorities did not yet systematically drive humanitarian decision-making, advocacy, or response planning. As OCHA does not directly implement humanitarian programmes, its core AAP responsibility is to enable a collective, system-wide approach. However, fragmented approaches, unclear roles, limited leadership and accountability mechanisms, siloed working across cross-cutting priorities, and inconsistent implementation across country operations continue to constrain OCHA’s ability to ensure that humanitarian responses are consistently and meaningfully shaped by the priorities and feedback of people affected by crisis​ (OCHA, 2025[36])​.

Efforts to strengthen AAP were closer to adaptation by design where corporate commitments were matched by sustained field-level capacity and functioning feedback mechanisms; where these capacities were under-resourced, implementation risked becoming adaptation by attrition.