




MOPAN INSIGHTS

MOPAN Biennial Synthesis 2026

Multilateral Organisations' Response to
the Current Funding Environment

2026 Stocktake

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	African Development Fund
AfDB	African Development Bank
AI	Artificial Intelligence
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CDC (Africa CDC)	Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CRS	Creditor Reporting System (OECD)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
FFI	Future Focus Initiative (UNICEF)
GAVI	Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GNI	Gross National Income
Global Fund	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
GSSC	Global Shared Services Centre
HDP Nexus	Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus
HICs	High-Income Countries
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative

HNPW	Humanitarian Networks and Partnerships Weeks
IA	Internal Audit
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDB Invest	Inter-American Investment Corporation
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	International Financial Institution
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LICs	Low-Income Countries
LMICs	Lower-Middle-Income Countries
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MLF	Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
MO	Multilateral Organisation
MOPAN	Multilateral Performance Network
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBAS	Performance-Based Allocation System (IFAD)
PCB	Programme Coordinating Board (UNAIDS)
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
SDG / SDGs	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SEA/SH	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse / Sexual Harassment
SEAH	Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UN80	United Nations 80th Anniversary Reform Initiative
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDS	United Nations Development System
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UN Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UMICs	Upper-Middle-Income Countries
USG	United Nations Under-Secretary-General
WB	World Bank
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

Executive Summary

The multilateral system is moving from absorbing a funding shock to adapting to a structurally tighter resource environment. The sharp contraction in development co-operation recorded in 2025 is expected to slow but not reverse. For many donor-dependent organisations, lower resources are now being built into future budgets and operating assumptions, pushing them beyond immediate cost controls towards deeper changes in structures, programmes and operating models. These adjustments are protecting selected priorities but are also reducing the breadth and intensity of support and placing pressure on the institutional capabilities needed to respond to future needs. The strategic question has therefore shifted from how to manage a temporary shortfall to what organisations can continue to do, which capabilities need to be preserved, and how roles should evolve in a system with fewer and less predictable resources.

Box 1. What has changed since the 2025 MOPAN mapping?

The funding shock is becoming a structural planning assumption. Lower resource expectations now extend into future budgets and replenishment cycles.

Adaptation is moving beyond short-term cost containment and changing operating models. Temporary cost containment measures are increasingly accompanied by workforce redesign, programme reprioritisation, relocation and consolidation of functions, shared services and digitalisation.

The consequences are shifting from visible cuts to deeper capability loss. Reduced reach and support quality are accompanied by pressure on technical expertise, normative and policy functions, knowledge and evidence, surge capacity and sustained country support.

Comparative advantage is being used more explicitly to guide organisation-level prioritisation, but not yet a system-wide division of labour. Organisations are focusing more deliberately on functions and thematic areas where they see a recognised lead role but collective assessment of roles and capacity across the system remains limited.

The 2026 MOPAN stocktake of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to the current funding environment combines survey responses from 25 organisations with a structured public-source review covering 39 organisations. It provides an up-to-date evidence base on the funding pressures facing multilateral organisations and their responses, compares how organisations with different financing and operating models are adapting, and examines the cumulative implications of these changes for multilateral effectiveness and ongoing reform. The stocktake is the first output of the 2026 MOPAN Biennial Synthesis.

Key findings

Funding pressures are persisting and extending into future funding cycles, but exposure differs across financing models.

Preliminary OECD data point to a sharp real decline in ODA in 2025 and further contraction in 2026, while 23 of 25 survey respondents expected further funding pressure. For many organisations this is no longer being treated as a one-year shock. UN entities and other organisations dependent on voluntary or assessed contributions face direct pressure on staffing, programmes and institutional functions; some funds and partnerships are adjusting through smaller replenishments and tighter future allocations; while MDB ordinary-capital operations remain more buffered by capital, market borrowing and internally generated income, and, in some cases, by donor choices that have maintained support to MDB financing.

Funding quality is as consequential as funding volume.

Reductions in earmarked resources are most directly associated with programme delivery and technical assistance, while losses of core and assessed resources reach more deeply into staffing, policy, normative, evidence and corporate functions. Even when aggregated total income is maintained, this can mask a weakening of organisations' ability to allocate resources strategically, maintain expertise or respond flexibly. One-off contributions, reserve use, co-financing and new funding sources have helped some organisations buffer immediate losses, but often without providing the same flexibility or predictability as the resources they replace.

Organisations are moving from short-term containment towards structural adaptation.

All 25 respondents reported measures to adapt to the funding environment, and workforce-related measures remain the most widespread structural response. Hiring and expenditure controls increasingly sit alongside workforce restructuring, relocation and consolidation of functions, shared services, programme reprioritisation, digitalisation and AI. These measures are increasingly changing how organisations operate: functions are moving across locations, decision-making is being brought closer to countries in some cases, administrative services are being consolidated, and digital tools are being embedded in workflows and grant management.

Organisations are seeking to broaden sources and mechanisms of financing to sustain their work.

Eighteen respondents reported donor-diversification efforts, involving programme countries, non-traditional sovereign donors, vertical funds, financial institutions, foundations and private-sector partners. Pooled funds, co-financing and partnerships are also prominent. These approaches have partly offset losses in some organisations: FAO reported that increased reliance on vertical funds helped absorb declining traditional-donor finance, while providing less flexibility. The strategic challenge is to secure resources that sustain essential functions as well as individual programmes.

The multilateral system is losing both coverage and delivery and institutional capacities, but the cumulative scale of that contraction across the system is not yet clear.

Twenty-three of 25 respondents reported experienced or expected programme-level effects, including fewer people, countries or activities supported, lower intensity, frequency or quality of assistance, and reductions in technical assistance, evidence, surge capacity and systems strengthening. These pressures also extend to specialist expertise, policy and normative work, knowledge and data, sustained country support and the capacity to respond to overlapping crises. Formal commitments to gender equality, human rights and inclusion remain protected in paper, but specialist staff and country engagement are thinner. These organisation-level reductions point to a broader loss of collective capacity, but there is still no consolidated picture of which functions, expertise or geographic coverage have been lost across the system, or whether they are being replaced elsewhere.

Comparative advantage is increasingly used to decide what to prioritise, protect or reduce, but it is not yet producing a system-wide division of labour.

Twenty of 25 respondents reported some change in how they define or operationalise comparative advantage: 18 are focusing more clearly on functions where they have a recognised lead role, 17 on thematic areas, and 10 are reducing activities where other actors may be better placed. These remain primarily organisation-level rather than the result of a systematic assessment of comparative advantage across institutions or of an analysis of the interdependencies in delivery. With funding and capacity declining across several organisations simultaneously, activities and geographies they leave are unlikely to be fully covered elsewhere, with a likely loss of collective coverage and system-wide capacity.

Funding-driven adjustment is increasingly being packaged as reform implementation.

Many of the implemented measures were not initiated by system-wide reform initiatives. Some measures pre-dated UN80 and formed part of existing organisational reform processes; others were triggered directly by the funding contraction; in some cases, funding pressure accelerated reforms already under way; and some have subsequently been incorporated into or presented through wider reform agendas. Under UN80, this is most visible in shared services, digitalisation, consolidation, relocation and process simplification; under the Humanitarian Reset, it is clearest in sharper prioritisation, simpler planning and leaner coordination. These measures can support reform objectives, but cost reductions, smaller structures or narrower programmes are not themselves evidence of successful reform: the relevant question is whether they preserve capability and service quality while reducing duplication and improving effectiveness.

The more structural elements of reform are not yet keeping pace with organisation-level adjustment.

There is less evidence of systematic redistribution of functions between organisations, system-wide reconfiguration of geographic presence or a shared assessment of which capabilities the multilateral system needs to preserve. Under UN80, wider decisions on programmes, roles and institutional structures remain less advanced than efficiency measures; and under the Humanitarian Reset, progress on localisation, stronger country leadership and clearer division of labour is more uneven.

Overall, the 2026 evidence points to a multilateral system becoming leaner through many separate organisational decisions, without a consolidated view of the capacity, expertise and coverage that should be preserved across the system.

The next phase of reform needs to connect those decisions. Organisational prioritisation can generate sharper mandates, clearer roles and efficiency gains, but simultaneous contraction across institutions also creates the possibility of cumulative losses in coverage and essential capabilities.

Table 1. Issues to consider as reform progresses

For Member States

Establish what capacity and reach remain across the system by mapping cumulative reductions and overlapping withdrawals before taking further structural decisions

Accelerate rationalisation based on system-wide comparative advantage by clarifying which organisations should lead, support, share or exit functions while preserving essential capabilities

Align funding with the core functions expected to be sustained by providing flexible and predictable resources for institutional resilience alongside targeted or one-off support for individual programmes

Assess reform against its intended objectives by examining its contribution to coherent delivery, reduced duplication, service quality, stronger localisation and clearer roles, alongside financial savings.

For multilateral organisations

Base restructuring on mandate delivery and comparative advantage by protecting essential capabilities and assessing the organisation's role alongside those of other actors.

Consider system interdependencies when reducing or withdrawing from activities and plan changes with multilateral, national, local and non-governmental partners to minimise disruption to coverage and essential functions.

Demonstrate whether adaptation measures are delivering the intended reform result by examining its contribution to coherent delivery, reduced duplication, service quality, stronger localisation and clearer roles, alongside financial savings

Introduction

The multilateral system continues to operate in a constrained and uncertain financing environment, alongside an increasingly active agenda of organisational and system-wide reform. MOPAN's 2025 Mapping of Multilateral Organisations' Response to the Current Funding Environment (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2025^[1]) provided an initial stocktake of the funding pressures affecting multilateral organisations (MOs) and of the measures being considered or introduced in response. This 2026 update takes place in a context where financing pressures are continuing, and organisations have had more time to implement, adjust or reconsider their initial responses. At the same time, reform processes that were then at an earlier stage have progressed, providing a stronger basis for examining whether and how organisation-level responses to financial constraint are aligning with wider efforts to improve effectiveness, efficiency and coherence across the multilateral system.

In this context, timely and comparable information is important for informed decision making. The 2026 MOPAN stocktake has therefore three related objectives. First, it seeks to provide MOPAN members, MOs and other stakeholders with an up-to-date evidence base on the funding environment and on organisational responses to it. Second, the comparative approach is intended to support learning across organisations by identifying similarities and differences in how MOs operating under different institutional and financial conditions are responding to comparable pressures, and by highlighting relevant implementation experience where evidence is available. Third, considering these developments across organisations provides a basis for examining their potential cumulative implications for multilateral effectiveness, including how changes in organisational priorities, capacities and operating arrangements interact across the wider system.

The analysis draws on survey responses from 25 multilateral organisations¹ that MOPAN has assessed previously or is currently assessing, complemented by a structured review of public-source documents examining evidence on funding outlooks, operational effects, adaptation measures and reform implementation.

This stocktake forms part of the pilot 2026 MOPAN Biennial Synthesis. The Biennial Synthesis has been designed to provide a system-wide analysis of how multilateral organisations can remain effective while responding to shared global challenges and institutional change in a context of financial constraint. Its first edition focuses on system-wide reform and brings together evidence from MOPAN assessments, Performance Insights work and complementary analytical inputs. Within this broader exercise, this first output provides a dedicated evidence base on the changing funding environment, organisational adaptation and the relationship between funding-related measures and ongoing reform processes.

The purpose of the report is therefore not only to update the information presented in the 2025 mapping, but to provide a consistent basis for tracking developments over time and across different parts of the multilateral system. It considers the scale and nature of funding pressures, the organisational measures being taken in response, their effects on delivery and institutional capacity, and their interaction with relevant reform processes. In doing so, the analysis seeks to contribute evidence for both organisation-level decision making and a broader understanding of the implications of current adjustments for multilateral effectiveness.

1 Organisations that responded to the survey: CGIAR, FAO, GAVI, GEF, Global Fund, GPE, ILO, IOM, MLF (Montreal Protocol), OHCHR, UN Habitat, UNCDF, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNOCHA, UNOPS, UNRWA, UN Women, WFP, WHO

Methodology

The mapping uses two complementary evidence streams. The first is a revised survey sent to a sample of 39 multilateral organisations that MOPAN has previously assessed or is currently assessing². Twenty-five responses were received, for a response rate of 64.1%, including 19 UN agencies, funds or programmes and 6 multi-stakeholder partnerships or trust funds. The second is a structured public-source review covering the same 39 organisations and integrating evidence on funding outlook, operational effects, adaptation measures and reform implementation.

The survey was designed to capture differences by organisation type and operating model; realised and expected funding reductions; funding streams affected; impacts on functions, corporate systems and oversight; programme effects; adaptation measures and their stated purpose; geographic and workforce change; comparative advantage definition and operationalisation; cross-cutting commitments; and tailored evidence from organisations responding to humanitarian crises, IFIs, partnerships and vertical funds (See Questionnaire in Annex 1).

The public-source review covered the period 1 September 2025 to 30 July 2026. For substantive comparison, it treats 15 September 2025 – the cut-off date of the 2025 MOPAN Mapping Report of Multilateral Organisations' Response to the Current Funding Environment – as the baseline, while retaining relevant transition-period evidence from the preceding fortnight.

Artificial intelligence (AI) was used throughout the data collection process as a research-support tool to increase the efficiency, coverage and traceability of evidence collection. It supported large-scale information retrieval, organisation, processing, preliminary classification and later navigation of the evidence base. AI was not used to formulate analytical assumptions or determine findings; all AI-assisted outputs were subject to systematic human review and validation.

Following human validation, AI supported consolidation of the evidence, preparation of preliminary organisational summaries and the generation of source manifests containing key identifying and retrieval information for each document, including its title, issuing organisation, publication year and URL. These manifests supported the automated retrieval of 744 unique source documents, including official budget and financial documents, governing-body and assembly records, organisational reports and statements, pledging documentation, news reporting and other grey literature. An analytical MAXQDA codebook developed for this exercise then supported AI-assisted screening and reducing the corpus to 363 documents assessed as most relevant for detailed qualitative analysis.

Following manual review and coding of these documents in MAXQDA, a final dataset of 901 unique coded excerpts was subjected to further analysis. At this stage, AI was used primarily as a navigation and retrieval tool to locate specific evidence across the coded corpus and to identify relevant quantitative or qualitative information. Final interpretation, triangulation with survey results and analytical conclusions remained the responsibility of the research team.

2 ADB; AfDB; CDB; CGIAR; EBRD; FAO; Gavi; GCF; GEF; The Global Fund; GPE; ICRC; IDB; IDB Invest; IFC; IFAD; ILO; IOM; MLF; OCHA; OHCHR; UNAIDS; UNCDF; UNCTAD; UNDP; UNEP; UNESCO; UNFPA; UN-Habitat; UNHCR; UNICEF; UNIDO; UNODC; UNOPS; UNRWA; UN Women; WB; WFP; WHO.

Limitations

The public-source evidence draws heavily on official organisational and governing-body material. This provides good traceability for financial figures, formal decisions and management intentions, but it may give less visibility to implementation status, partner experience, staff effects, realised efficiency gains and service quality. Media, donor and civil-society sources provide partial triangulation but are uneven across organisations.

The survey complements this evidence with information reported by the organisations on adaptation measures, their stated purpose, experienced or expected effects, but it does not systematically assess whether intended savings, efficiency gains or other results were achieved. The stocktake is therefore better suited to identifying measures taken, implementation experience and emerging effects than to assessing whether individual measures have achieved their intended efficiency or effectiveness results.

The survey results are descriptive of the responding organisations rather than statistically representative of the full multilateral system. The sample was purposive and participation voluntary, creating possible response bias. Denominators vary across questions because of routing, multiple-response options, non-response and “not applicable” or “unable to answer” selections; these are stated where they affect interpretation. No multilateral development bank (MDB) or other capital-based international financial institution responded to the survey. Survey-based aggregate findings should consequently not be interpreted as representative of MDBs, whose financing and operating models differ substantially from those of many other respondents. MDBs were nevertheless included in the structured review of public sources covering the full sample.

Background

A more constrained development co-operation landscape


MOPAN's 2025 mapping, reflecting information available as of 15 September 2025, already identified signs of a structural contraction in multilateral funding for development and humanitarian assistance, and warned that organisation-level adjustment was moving faster than the wider reform processes intended to manage that change (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2025^[1]). At that point, however, the full-year scale of the 2025 contraction in official development assistance (ODA), its likely near-term trajectory and the implementation status of several system-wide reform initiatives were not yet clear. By the time of this analysis, the financing downturn has become more measurable and its persistence more evident.

Preliminary OECD DAC data put ODA from DAC members and associates at USD 174.3 billion in 2025, equivalent to 0.26% of their combined GNI and a 23.1% real decline from 2024 on the grant-equivalent measure. Twenty-six of 34 providers reduced their ODA. The contraction was nevertheless highly concentrated: France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States accounted for 95.7% of the aggregate decline, with the United States alone accounting for 75.1% (OECD, 2026^[2]). The cuts also extended beyond more volatile components of aid. Net bilateral expenditure on development programmes, projects and technical co-operation – excluding humanitarian assistance, in-donor refugee costs and debt relief – fell by 26.3%, while humanitarian assistance declined by 35.8% (OECD, 2026^[2]).

The OECD's June 2026 projections indicate that the contraction is likely to continue, although at a slower pace than in 2025. On the net-flow measure used for forward projections, ODA declined by 23.3% in 2025 after an 8.5% fall in 2024 and is projected to fall by a further 6.9% in 2026, to around USD 152 billion – the lowest level since 2014 (OECD, 2026^[3]). This strengthens the evidence that the contraction in development co-operation is continuing beyond 2025, rather than returning to the growth trajectory that preceded 2024.

The multilateral system is exposed to this contraction, but unevenly. Core multilateral ODA fell by 12.7% in 2025 to USD 47.9 billion. Core contributions to UN entities fell by 27%, whereas ODA-eligible core support to the World Bank institutions and funds – notably IDA – increased by 6.4%, and support to regional development banks by 11.9% (OECD, 2026^[2]). The increases for both the World Bank and regional development banks in 2025 largely reflected disbursements from previous replenishment cycles. In 2026, core funding is projected to decline by a further 4.8% for the UN, 6.3% for the World Bank and 5% for regional development banks (OECD, 2026^[3]).

The distinction between donor contributions and the financing that multilateral organisations subsequently provide is particularly important for the MDBs. Their capital structures, market borrowing and previously agreed replenishments can allow lending volumes to remain relatively resilient even when current donor ODA falls.

Figure 1. DAC members' total contributions to the multilateral system, 2010-24 and projections

Note: Calculations are based on disbursements, in 2023 constant prices. Projections are generated by applying each donor's ODA percentage change, as estimated in (OECD, 2025), to their respective multilateral contributions.

Source: (OECD, 2026[4]) Multilateral Development Finance 2026, p. 61, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2026/04/multilateral-development-finance-2026_4fdfa737/0720370a-en.pdf

The pressure is also about funding quality, not only volume. The UN Secretary-General's 2026 QCPR funding analysis records USD 45.2 billion in contributions to UN operational activities for development and humanitarian assistance in 2024, 17% below their 2022 peak, and estimates a further 12% decline in 2025. Core resources accounted for just 18% of total contributions and 12% of voluntary contributions, leaving 88% of voluntary funding earmarked to some degree (United Nations Secretary-General, 2026[5]). The report links this predominance of short-term and tightly earmarked project funding to fragmentation, competition among entities and higher transaction costs (United Nations Secretary-General, 2026[5]).

These trends are unfolding within a broader squeeze in financing for development beyond ODA. The UN's Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2026 estimates the annual financing and investment gap for achieving the SDGs at more than USD 4 trillion and identifies shrinking fiscal space, high capital and debt-service costs, declining aid and fragmentation of international economic relations as mutually reinforcing constraints on developing countries (United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development, 2026[6]). The Sevilla Commitment, adopted in 2025, establishes a renewed framework for addressing investment, debt and reform of the international financial architecture. It also reaffirms ODA as a key component of international development co-operation, calls for reversing its decline and reiterates existing ODA commitments, including to least developed countries. By the first half of 2026, however, implementation was still at an early stage (United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development, 2026[6]). The resulting backdrop is therefore one in which demands on development and humanitarian finance remain high while concessional public resources are becoming scarcer and less predictable.

Reform agendas are partially implemented, with uncertain results

Several reform processes that were still emerging in the 2025 MOPAN mapping have started to move further towards implementation, although progress is still uneven. UN80 has developed from three broad workstreams covering efficiency and operations, mandate review and implementation, and programme or structural realignment, into a more "decisive" phase, distinguishing decisions already taken from proposals requiring further design, consultation or Member State approval (United Nations Secretary-General, 2026[7]).

The clearest concrete progress includes General Assembly resolution 80/251 on mandate creation, implementation and review (United Nations General Assembly, 2026[8]); efficiency and administrative consolidation within the Secretariat and work on common services, technology and data. Progress on the more structural elements is less advanced. Assessments have been undertaken on possible organisational mergers and other forms of institutional realignment, but major proposals remain subject to governing-body and Member State decisions. For example, the UNFPA-UN Women merger assessment had been completed by April 2026, and additional analytical evidence on a potential merger and proposed alternative options to enhance alignment, impact and efficiency was shared with the agencies' Executive Boards thereafter, while further work was still required on the UNDP-UNOPS option; these assessments had not to date translated into agreed mergers or a common implementation timetable. Other proposals on country-team configuration, regional arrangements and joint knowledge capacities are likewise at different stages of design or implementation (United Nations Secretary-General, 2026[7]).

The Humanitarian Reset is also moving into implementation, although progress across its different ambitions is difficult to assess systematically. The IASC's November 2025 Roadmap translated the Reset into four pillars (Define, Deliver, Devolve and Defend) and January 2026 guidance described its objective as a tighter focus on life-saving assistance, more agile and context-appropriate delivery, stronger country leadership, deeper engagement with affected communities and stronger defence of humanitarian principles (IASC, 2025[9]) (IASC, 2026[10]). The most visible changes are the hyper-prioritisation of humanitarian response and simplification of planning and co-ordination. The 2026 Global Humanitarian Overview identified requirements of USD 33 billion to support 135 million people, while establishing an immediate hyper-prioritised plan of USD 23 billion for 87 million people (OCHA, 2025[11]). Humanitarian planning timelines and documents have also been shortened, and the global cluster architecture has been streamlined (IASC, 2026[10]).

The Reset has broader objectives around country leadership, localisation, clearer roles, common operational approaches and accountability to affected populations. More recent IASC reporting points to progress across these areas, including stronger country-level leadership, changes in coordination, supply chains and common services and increased use of pooled funding, while noting that overall progress remains uneven across the Reset's ambitions (IASC, 2026[12]).

MDB reform, meanwhile, is better characterised as implementation and deepening of an existing agenda than the emergence of a fundamentally new one. At the November 2025 G20 Summit, leaders welcomed the first implementation report on the G20 Roadmap for Better, Bigger and More Effective MDBs and called for continued implementation of capital-adequacy reforms, greater risk sharing with the private sector and new instruments to expand lending capacity (G20, 2025[13]). In April 2026, MDB heads reiterated a common agenda centred on expanding financing capacity, mobilising private finance and strengthening institutional collaboration amid tighter financial conditions (World Bank Group, 2026[14]).

Overall, the context for the 2026 stocktake is therefore different from 2025 in two respects: the scale and persistence of the funding contraction are now clearer, while reform processes have started to move further towards implementation, but at markedly different speeds. This provides the backdrop for examining how individual multilateral organisations are being affected, what measures they are taking, and how far those adjustments align with wider reform objectives.

Magnitude and impact of funding pressures

Key takeaways


- Funding pressures are persisting and extending into future funding cycles, but exposure differs across financing models.
- Funding quality is as consequential as funding volume: losses of core resources affect a wider range of organisational capabilities.
- Temporary buffers have softened some near-term reductions without resolving underlying problems of predictability and flexibility.

Funding pressures are persisting, but exposure differs across financing models.

For most donor-dependent organisations, the current funding pressure is no longer treated as a short-term shock. The exceptionally sharp contraction recorded in 2025 is not expected to continue at the same scale (OECD, 2026[3]). This nevertheless represents continued contraction from an already lower base rather than a return to previous funding levels. Lower resource assumptions are consequently extending into future budget and replenishment cycles, but the form and operational significance of the pressure depend on how each organisation is financed.

Around 80% of organisations responding to the 2026 MOPAN survey reported a confirmed reduction in funding in 2025. Eight placed the reduction at between 1% and 10%, five at 11–20%, four at 21–30%, and two at 31–40%. Six reported no reduction.

Figure 2. Most responding organisations confirmed funding reductions in 2025



Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions.

UNAIDS, UNHCR, WHO, WFP and OHCHR experienced substantial reductions in resources available for their core or operational work. UNAIDS reported that core funding had fallen by more than half since 2024 and reduced the capacity of its Secretariat and Cosponsors by more than 50% (UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board, 2026[16]); UNHCR reported that in 2025 only 37% of the \$10.604 billion operational budget was funded, resulting in a global funding shortfall of \$6.7 billion – the biggest in UNHCR's recent history (UNHCR, 2026[17]) and WHO faced unpaid assessed contributions, terminated voluntary agreements and continuing earmarking constraints, leaving a significant salary and programme gap despite apparently high aggregate financing when projected resources were included (WHO, 2025[18]).

WFP's confirmed contributions fell by 33%, from USD 9.8 billion in 2024 to USD 6.5 billion in 2025, covering only 41% of operational requirements. Its 2026 provisional implementation plan represents 59% of requirements and is designed to assist 94 million people, compared with approximately 110 million under full funding (WFP, 2025[19]) (WFP, 2026[20]) while OHCHR received USD 191.5 million of its USD 246 million approved regular-budget resources in 2025 and USD 257.8 million against an extra-budgetary requirement of USD 500 million (OHCHR, 2026[21]).

FAO also broadens the picture. Voluntary contributions fell by 8% in 2025, while traditional-donor funding was reported to be around 15% below 2024; increased reliance on vertical funds partly offset the volume decline but reduced flexibility (FAO, 2026[22]). Regarding some of the organisations with normative mandates, UNESCO faced a USD 75.4 million non-payment of its 2025 assessed contribution and limited implementation of its USD 685.4 million regular budget to approximately USD 610 million, about 11% below the approved level (UNESCO, 2026[23]), while for UNEP's case, the Environment Fund income was USD 84.9 million against a USD 100 million budget in 2025, while UN Regular Budget income was USD 20.7 million against USD 24.5 million (UNEP, 2026[24]) (UNEP, 2026[25]).

Some of the initial estimates were more pessimistic than the reductions subsequently reported.

In response to the 2025 MOPAN survey, 12 of the 14 organisations able to provide a forward estimate expected a reduction, and seven expected it to be at least 21%. Among 12 organisations for which the expected 2025 band and the subsequently reported realised band are broadly comparable, eight reported a lower realised reduction than they had anticipated, two (2) a higher reduction and two (2) approximately the same. The comparison is indicative only because the questions, samples, baselines and funding bands are not fully identical. It may nevertheless suggest that some organisations mitigated or deferred part of the anticipated near-term loss.

This distinction is important. Smaller-than-expected reductions do not necessarily indicate that the funding environment improved. Several organisations responding to the survey attributed apparent resilience to one-off receipts, use of reserves, successful mobilisation of non-core resources, support from programme countries, new donors, co-financing or replacement of flexible resources with more restricted contributions (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]).


UNOPS provides a different example of resilience. In the 2025 survey, it anticipated a 1–10% reduction in parts of its portfolio, while expecting this to be fully offset by increased demand for other services. This expectation was borne out in 2025. In its 2026 survey response, UNOPS reported USD 2.7 billion in project implementation for 2025, broadly unchanged from 2024, while new agreements signed with partners exceeded USD 3 billion, above previous years. Unlike most organisations covered by the survey, UNOPS does not receive assessed or voluntary contributions (2026, MOPAN Survey – UNOPS). As a demand-driven, fee-for-service organisation, UNOPS was able in 2025 to offset lower demand in some parts of its portfolio with growth elsewhere.

More importantly for the forward outlook, 20 respondents had received at least one formal notice of a reduction, contribution withdrawal, lower pledge or reduced replenishment expectation (either for 2026, 2027 or beyond). Including informal indications, 23 of 25 respondents reported some expectation of further pressure.

"While income decline was originally not as steep as projected and UNICEF has shown resilience, this largely reflects timing effects and one-off factors rather than a substantive improvement in the funding environment."
(MOPAN survey, 2026 – UNICEF)

Figure 3. Most organisations expect funding pressure to continue

Formal notice of funding reductions, contribution withdrawals, lower pledges or reduced replenishment expectations




Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions.

Six organisations were unable to estimate the scale of the reduction in their next budget or replenishment cycle, and one considered the question not applicable. Among the remaining 18 respondents, 16 expected a reduction. The most common estimate was between 11% and 20% (7 respondents). This provides stronger evidence than was available in 2025 that the contraction is becoming structural: the majority of responding organisations are incorporating lower resource assumptions into future plans rather than treating the reductions as a one-year liquidity problem.

Figure 4. Lower resource expectations are extending into future budget and replenishment cycles

Scale of estimated funding reduction for the next budget or replenishment cycle relative to the previous one



Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions.

The contraction is also spreading to funds and partnerships. The 2026 survey provides greater visibility over funds and partnerships than the previous exercise. Four out of 6 multi-stakeholder partnerships or trust funds assessed the future outlook for total pledges and funding predictability as negative to some degree (moderately negative or severely negative).

Gavi reported a remaining USD 2 billion shortfall against its Gavi 6.0 ambition in January 2026 and recalibrated its programme envelope and strategy (Gavi, 2026[26]). As of 24 September 2026, GEF-9 was endorsed at USD 4.3 billion, around 19% below the USD 5.33 billion pledged for GEF-8 (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 2026[27]) (GEF, 2026[28]). Announced pledges for the Global Fund's eighth replenishment were 14% below the seventh replenishment, although early conversion of pledges into cash was ahead of the equivalent stage in earlier cycles (MOPAN survey, 2026 – The Global Fund).

These examples indicate that funding pressure extends beyond UN entities dependent on annual voluntary contributions. They also show that effects on funds may emerge through smaller future programme envelopes, stricter allocation choices or slower expansion rather than immediate cuts to an administrative structure.

This financing-model distinction is even more important for multilateral development banks (MDBs).

None of the eight MDB/IFIs invited to participate in the 2026 MOPAN survey submitted a response. The survey included dedicated questions for IFIs to reflect their different financial models, but some institutions explained to MOPAN that they had not experienced funding reductions and therefore many of these adaptation measures were not relevant to them. The World Bank explained that it was unable to respond given the nature of the questions, particularly those concerning a changing financing environment and its responses to it. ADB was more explicit, stating that it had not experienced funding reductions in recent years and had therefore not needed to take measures in response, leading it to consider the survey not applicable.

Moreover, funding from bilateral donors does not affect MDBs in the same way as grant- and contribution-funded organisations. EBRD, for example, finances its administrative budget largely from profits and margins generated through financial operations with clients rather than from annual donor contributions. Donor fiscal pressure may still affect MDBs through concessional windows, grants, trust funds and special facilities, but it does not necessarily translate into lower ordinary-capital lending, smaller administrative budget or the types of organisational retrenchment observed among donor-dependent organisations.

Recent replenishments appear to indicate that MDBs might have been somewhat protected from funding cuts. For instance, ADF-17 mobilised a record USD 11 billion for 2026-28, 23% more than the previous replenishment, while moving towards greater balance-sheet leverage, market borrowing and hybrid capital (African Development Fund, 2026[29]). IDA21, agreed in December 2024, likewise secured a record USD 100 billion financing package for FY2025-28, supported by USD 23.7 billion in donor pledges and increased leverage (IDA, 2026[30]).

Funding quality is as important as funding volume

Changes in funding quality are a distinct source of financial pressure, alongside funding volume. Seventeen respondents ranked voluntary earmarked or non-core contributions among their three most affected funding sources. Eleven (11) ranked voluntary core or regular resources, seven (7) assessed contributions and five (5) replenishment resources. These responses capture different problems: while reductions in any funding stream lower overall resources, shifts away from flexible or assessed resources can have distinct impacts on organisational capacity.

Earmarked contributions were therefore the most widely affected stream. However, the source-to-impact matrix (see figure 5) suggests that loss of core and assessed funding affects a wider set of organisational areas. Of the ten cases involving voluntary core or regular resources, ten linked the reduction to staffing, ten to programme delivery, eight to corporate functions, seven to technical assistance and seven to data or evidence. Earmarked-resource reductions were most often linked to programme delivery and technical assistance. Assessed-contribution reductions were particularly associated with staffing and normative functions (MOPAN survey, 2026).

Figure 5. Matrix. Reductions in core resources have broad institutional implications

Selected most affected funding sources and main areas where impacts are being felt											
Assessed contributions	3	2	0	2	5	1	4	4	6	4	1
Investment income	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Programme / project fees	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Replenishment resources	3	2	3	1	1	4	2	3	4	2	1
Service income or implementation fees	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Trust fund resources	1	1	0	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	0
Voluntary core / regular resources	8	7	4	5	5	6	7	10	10	7	0
Voluntary earmarked / non-core contributions	6	9	2	6	3	6	8	14	12	13	2
	Corporate functions	Data / monitoring / evidence	Financing / grants / lending	Geographic presence	Normative work	Partnerships	Policy advice	Programme delivery	Staffing	Technical assistance	Unable to answer / Don't know

Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions.

UNDP is a clear example. Total voluntary contributions increased by 4% in 2025, to approximately USD 4.9 billion, while core contributions fell from USD 581 million to USD 442 million (UNDP, 2026[31]). The organisation sustained aggregate delivery, but warned that continued core erosion would reduce its ability to act early, maintain programme quality and accountability, and support underfunded settings (UNDP, 2026[32]).

Similarly, UNHCR reported that the share of unearmarked funding pledged for 2026 had fallen to 17%, nearly half its 2023 level, reducing its capacity to allocate funding where needs were greatest (UNHCR, 2025[33]) and WHO reported that continued reliance on earmarked voluntary contributions posed challenges for aligning financing with programme priorities and maintaining flexibility, while flexible funds were used to reallocate resources strategically to areas where additional funding was not expected (WHO, 2026[34]).

In sum, despite some organisational resilience, the contraction can now be described more confidently as persistent among multilateral organisations. Funding pressure is becoming structural for many donor-dependent organisations, and the type of shock follows the type of funding. Reductions in flexible core or assessed resources, replenishment gaps, pledge-conversion delays and lower fee-generating demand affect organisational capacity and delivery through different channels, determining which functions contract and which organisations remain buffered.

Organisational responses

Key takeaways


- Organisations are moving beyond short-term cost containment towards structural changes in how they operate.
- Workforce-related measures remain the most widespread structural response, weakening organisational agility, surge capacity and the ability to provide sustained technical support.
- Funding pressures have not yet produced widespread changes in organisations' geographic footprint
- Organisations are diversifying funding sources and mechanisms, but alternative resources do not necessarily provide equivalent flexibility or predictability.

Organisations are responding through a combination of workforce and programme reductions, digitalisation, shared services, changes in geographical presence and new resource-mobilisation strategies. For several organisations, adjustment is moving beyond temporary containment towards longer-term changes in organisational structures and delivery models.

All 25 survey respondents reported at least one measure taken or planned to respond to the funding environment. Staff reductions were reported by 21 respondents and workforce restructuring by 20. Digitalisation or automation and the use of AI or data tools were each reported by 19, while 18 reported donor diversification efforts. Hiring freezes and streamlining roles and responsibilities were each reported by 16 respondents. Fifteen respondents reported internal consolidation of shared services, relocation of functions to lower-cost locations, and changes to their resource-mobilisation strategies.

Figure 6. Organisations are combining workforce measures with broader changes to operating models

Measures taken or planned to respond to funding constraints or preserve effectiveness



Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions.

This is a broader response than the one captured in the 2025 mapping. The 2026 survey responses describe initial controls such as hiring restrictions, recruitment pauses and expenditure restraint alongside organisational redesign, workforce realignment and wider changes to their operating models with the intention to place organisations on a more sustainable operating footing.

WHO, for instance, described its measures as serving both immediate cost reduction and longer-term sustainability and reported implementing a new organisational structure following its prioritisation and realignment exercise (2026, MOPAN Survey – WHO).

WFP stated that in addition to the pause in recruitment, cancelled planned posts, leaving vacant positions unfilled, and postponing position upgrade, and reductions in duty travel and more efficient procurement of utilities, supplies and IT equipment, WFP has since 2023 transitioned into a two-tier organisational structure, bringing authority and decision making closer to the field (2026, MOPAN Survey – WFP).

And Gavi describes a “combination of cost-reduction and structural reform measures”, including Secretariat resizing, workforce restructuring and lower non-workforce expenditure, alongside changes designed to create a “more country-centred, efficient and sustainable operating model” (2026 MOPAN Survey - Gavi).

Staff reductions remain the most widespread structural measure

Workforce-related measures have been widespread. They were applied by 22 responding organisations out of 25. Abolition of posts was the most commonly reported measure, cited by 21 respondents. Eighteen reported non-renewal of temporary or fixed-term contracts, 16 a hiring freeze, 16 voluntary separation or early retirement, 15 reductions in consultants, 15 relocation of personnel or functions, and 12 staff layoffs.

Figure 7. Most organisations are implementing or planning workforce reductions


Implemented or planned workforce-related measures since 2025



Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions.

The effects extend across professional levels. Fifteen respondents identified mid-level professionals as among the most affected categories, 12 senior professionals, 12 entry-level professionals and 11 consultants.

Figure 8. Workforce measures extend across professional levels



Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions.

The evidence shows major differences in scale and approach. UNAIDS reduced projected core-funded Secretariat posts from 671 to 296, with only 18 positions remaining in Geneva and its refocused country footprint from 85 to 54 countries (UNAIDS, 2026[35]); UNHCR reported nearly 5 000 job losses and changes affecting 185 locations by October 2025 (UNHCR, 2026[36]); WHO used natural attrition, retirement and voluntary early retirement within a broader realignment: it reported 1 275 voluntary separations and 1 232 abolished posts, while higher assessed contributions enabled approximately 600 posts to be preserved (MOPAN survey, 2026 – WHO).

ILO illustrates a more scenario-based approach to workforce adjustment. In March 2026, the organisation set out contingency measures linked to different possible levels of income shortfall. Staff reductions were described as a last resort and no decisions had been taken on the specific posts, units or locations that could be affected. Under the severe scenario considered at that stage, up to 350 positions could have been abolished from January 2027 (ILO, 2026[37]). By June, the contingency framework had been updated: continued cost containment and recruitment controls were expected to generate most of the required savings, with involuntary termination of around 120 positions identified as a measure of last resort if further savings were required (ILO, 2026[38]). In its 2026 MOPAN survey response, ILO reported that it had initiated a workforce adjustment exercise in June after considering reductions in non-staff costs, cost-containment measures, voluntary separations, a hiring freeze, voluntary reductions in working time and unpaid leave, with the workforce adjustment due to take effect from 1 January 2027 (MOPAN survey, 2026 – ILO).

Taken together, these examples show that workforce adjustment is taking different forms and is at different stages across organisations. UNAIDS and UNHCR illustrate large-scale reductions already implemented; WHO combined post abolition with attrition and voluntary measures to limit involuntary separations; while ILO used contingency scenarios to sequence possible further adjustments depending on its financial position to contain an immediate impact on staff. Across the sample, headline workforce figures can therefore refer to layoffs, abolition of vacant posts, non-renewal of contracts, voluntary separation, relocation or reprofiling of functions, or measures that remain conditional. These differences matter because they have different implications for recurring costs, operational capacity and institutional memory, and limit simple comparisons of staff reductions across organisations.

“The primary objective throughout this process was to safeguard the core functions of the Organization and align financial and human resources accordingly, while minimizing separations to the greatest degree possible.”
(MOPAN survey, 2026 – WHO)

Workforce reductions are weakening organisational agility, surge capacity and the ability to provide sustained technical support, while increasing pressure on remaining staff. The effects extend beyond the direct loss of posts. Respondents identified reduced ability to respond to emerging crises and weaker technical support to partners among the most common programme-level effects of the workforce-related measures. Responses point to a related set of consequences: loss of specialist expertise, thinner country and regional support, greater workloads for remaining personnel, reduced access to external expertise and less organisational flexibility to respond to overlapping demands.

UN-Habitat described the effect particularly clearly:

“The principal impact is reduced institutional agility and flexibility. The greatest pressure is on UN-Habitat’s ability to sustain upstream normative leadership, policy support, technical advisory services to Member States, surge capacity, innovation, and investments in data, evidence and knowledge. These functions rely disproportionately on flexible resources, yet they are precisely what underpin quality programme delivery and long-term development impact across the portfolio.”
(MOPAN survey, 2026 – UN-Habitat)

Additional evidence illustrates this pressure. UNESCO reported that its hiring freeze “generated capacity gaps, increased workload on existing staff, and reduced the ability to mobilize external expertise”; restrictions on travel and staffing also reduced field-office support and engagement with Member States (UNESCO, 2026[23]). FAO similarly reported that constrained funding had limited its ability to provide technical support to country offices, strengthen staff skills and partnerships, and identify and scale effective practices, while cuts to emergency and resilience programmes reduced its ability to recruit or retain some specialist capacity (MOPAN Survey, 2026 – FAO).

Effects can be particularly significant when organisations need to respond simultaneously across several locations. Following a workforce reduction of more than one-third, UNHCR reported lower speed, scale and reach in emergencies, especially when several major crises required response at the same time (UNHCR, 2026[17]). OHCHR likewise reduced field presence and Human Rights Adviser capacity, constraining a delivery model that depends heavily on specialist monitoring, investigation, technical support and sustained country engagement (OHCHR, 2026[21]).

Available gender-disaggregated information does not yet indicate a consistent system-wide gender effect. Thirteen respondents reported having relevant data and two had partial data. Several organisations reported broadly stable gender representation after restructuring. The limited and uneven evidence does not support a system-wide conclusion about differential impact.

Geographic presence remains broadly stable, with selective restructuring

Funding pressures have not yet produced widespread changes in organisations’ geographic footprint, but selective closures, relocations and new regional configurations are starting to be visible.

Throughout survey responses, “no significant change” was the most common substantive response across the different types of geographic presence. At organisation level, however, ten respondents reported at least one closure, reduction, consolidation or relocation, nine reported some form of expansion, and six reported both contraction and expansion in different parts of their network.

Where contraction is occurring, it is concentrated more in traditional country, regional and representation structures than in hubs and shared-service arrangements.

In the survey, country offices recorded five closures and five reductions, regional offices two closures and four reductions, and liaison or representation offices one closure and three reductions. No respondents reported closing thematic or knowledge hubs or shared-service centres. Additional evidence shows that closure also frequently involves redistribution rather than complete withdrawal. UNHCR closed its Southern Africa Regional Bureau but transferred regional support to Nairobi and Dakar and retained smaller presences through neighbouring offices and partners (UNHCR, 2025[39]). UNEP closed its Washington and Moscow offices while transferring representation to New York and Almaty (UNEP, 2026[25]), and WFP consolidated its regional-office structure (WFP, 2025[19]).

Figure 9. Geographical presence remains broadly stable, with selective restructuring

Geographical footprint change, or planned change, since 2025							
	Closure	Consolidation	Expansion	No significant change	Relocation	Reduction	Unable to answer
Country offices	5	3	2	11	0	5	7
Sub-regional offices	1	0	0	13	0	1	11
Regional offices	2	4	4	9	0	4	7
Multi-country offices	1	2	5	10	0	0	9
Liaison/ representation office	1	2	1	14	0	3	6
Thematic/technical/ knowledge hubs	0	1	2	10	1	1	10
Shared service centers	0	1	5	7	2	1	10

Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions.

UNICEF provides a particularly clear example of simultaneous consolidation and redistribution: it combined regional and field-office consolidation with substantial relocation of headquarters functions to lower-cost duty stations and the establishment of Centres of Excellence in Amman, Nairobi, Bangkok and Panama City to position technical capacity closer to country programming (UNICEF, 2026[40]).

Relocation measures reported by organisations in the 2026 survey are consistent with the picture presented by MOPAN in the 2025 Mapping report. In 2025, MOPAN found that 10 of 18 respondents were consolidating offices or functions and 9 were relocating functions to lower-cost locations (MOPAN survey, 2025). Relocation remains prominent in 2026: 15 of 25 respondents reported relocation to lower-cost locations. Some organisations are therefore maintaining broadly similar country networks while reducing headquarters capacity and moving functions between existing duty.

At the same time, organisations are creating or strengthening alternative forms of decentralised presence.

Survey responses recorded increases particularly in multi-country arrangements and shared-service centres, as well as some regional and technical or knowledge hubs. These are not necessarily new offices: in some cases organisations are adding capacity to existing locations. For instance, GPE explicitly reported an “expansion of decentralized offices in Paris, Brussels, Nairobi and Chennai”. All Africa-facing regional staff are now based in Paris or Nairobi, while its Chennai shared-services capacity has expanded. By December 2025, 53% of staff were in decentralised offices, compared with a model in which 94% of staff were based at Washington headquarters in June 2019. GPE attributes the shift to greater proximity to partner countries, stronger regional gender, finance and programme-management expertise and lower travel costs (GPE, 2025[41]).

One example of new presence is provided by UN-Habitat, reporting new country offices in Botswana and South Africa, a regional office in Istanbul and technical or knowledge arrangements in Montreal, Bilbao, China and the Gulf region. It linked these changes to greater proximity to country realities, stronger engagement with UN country teams and partners, and improved technical quality (MOPAN Survey, 2026 – UN-Habitat).

It is worth mentioning that not all footprint changes were caused by the latest funding reductions. FAO, for example, reported that its review of the country-office network had been under way for several years and was not a direct response to the current funding contraction (MOPAN survey, 2026 – FAO).

Further reconfiguration is also likely as UN80 and organisation-specific reforms move from design to implementation. UN80 is examining geographic presence through work on UN Country Team reconfiguration, the Regional Reset, Joint Knowledge Hubs and Expertise on Demand, with the aim of making country and regional arrangements more responsive to needs and drawing more systematically on expertise across the UN system. UNESCO, for example, reported that its geographical footprint would be considered as the UN80 work on UN Country Team reconfiguration, the Regional Reset and Expertise on Demand develops, alongside its UNESCO80 roadmap (MOPAN survey, 2026 – UNESCO).

The trade-offs remain significant for organisations undergoing these changes. The potential efficiency gains need to be weighed against changes in proximity, responsiveness and access to expertise. Among organisations able to assess the effects of footprint changes, crisis-response or surge capacity and partnership management were among the capacities most frequently reported as reduced, while technical and normative expertise and oversight were more often protected or prioritised; however, high levels of “unable to answer” responses limit comparison across the full sample.

Nevertheless, some organisations also reported in open-ended responses that moving functions to lower-cost locations or shared-service centres can reduce salary, premises and travel costs, while regional or knowledge hubs may bring expertise closer to programme countries. Conversely, where offices are closed, reduced or functions are centralised, respondents highlighted risks such as stretched technical capacity across larger geographies, reduced proximity to operations, weaker responsiveness and challenges in maintaining continuity of country knowledge and support functions. At the same time excessive consolidation, according to respondents, can also reduce access to policy and governing processes concentrated in headquarters locations. This reinforces MOPAN’s 2025 *Doing Better with Less* finding that relocation and consolidation can yield efficiencies, but that the benefits depend on transition management, strategic workforce planning and monitoring whether service quality and organisational capability are maintained (MOPAN, 2025[42]).

Shared services

Shared services are being used more extensively to reduce duplication and operating costs, with arrangements ranging from established global service centres to common back offices, common premises and shared operational platforms for procurement, logistics and mobility. Fifteen of 25 respondents reported consolidating common or shared services within their organisation, while nine reported increased use of services provided jointly or by other organisations. Among humanitarian respondents, nine of 17 characterised “shared services and system efficiency - including pooled logistics and procurement, common services and shared data and platforms” - as advancing through deliberate change.

UNDP’s Global Shared Services Centre (GSSC), established more than two decades ago, supports more than 70 UN partner entities. In 2025, it executed USD 6.8 billion in payments across 122 currencies, processed USD 2.3 billion in payroll for more than 50,000 personnel and handled 126,000 HR transactions across 170 countries. It also expanded its client base, adding ICAO and WMO and launching end-to-end personnel administration services for seven additional partner organisations. UNDP also reports service-performance indicators alongside transaction volumes. According to their own report, all monthly payroll transactions were disbursed on time, finance services achieved a 94.2% service-level agreement rate, and process improvements reduced average invoice-processing time by 36% and supplier-processing time by 26% in 2025 (UNDP, 2026[43]).

UNFPA reports participation in Business Operations Strategies across all country offices, 82% of offices operating from common premises and participation across common back-office arrangements. It is also an early adopter of global shared services, including treasury and payroll, and has relocated selected headquarters support functions to Nairobi in connection with the UN Office at Nairobi common back office. UNFPA reported USD 27.7 million in operational efficiencies in 2025, almost twice the USD 14.7 million reported in 2024 (UNFPA, 2026[44]).

UNOPS also provides shared transactional services in procurement, payments and human resources, with its Global Shared Services Centre serving more than 30 UN entities and 19 hosted entities and programmes. In 2025, UNOPS reported USD 69 million in entity-specific efficiency gains through annual reporting facilitated by DCO, including USD 45 million associated with its contract modalities (UNOPS, 2026[45]).

WFP manages 113 of the 190 common services provided by UN entities in 81 of the 132 countries implementing Business Operations Strategies. WFP also provides six global shared services, including the UN Fleet and the UN Booking Hub. The Booking Hub operated in 140 countries for 22 UN entities and generated a reported USD 18 million in efficiency gains in 2025, including USD 9.3 million through shared mobility, USD 5.9 million through accommodation services and USD 1.9 million through shared medical and wellness services. WFP also reported USD 11.2 million in realised benefits from Business Operations Strategy initiatives in 2025, principally from joint premises (WFP, 2026[20]). More broadly, WFP reported USD 235.6 million in efficiency gains across 52 initiatives in 2025, exceeding its USD 169.9 million target (WFP, 2026[20]).

These examples illustrate what stronger monitoring can look like, encompassing transaction volumes and service-quality indicators. Such practices remain exceptions rather than the norm. Across much of the evidence base, organisations report participation in shared services or anticipated savings without yet demonstrating whether gains are net of transition costs or whether service quality, responsiveness and organisational capability have been maintained.

Digitalisation and AI

Digitalisation, automation and AI are among the most widely reported organisational responses and their role increasingly extends beyond cost-saving measures to changes in how organisations manage workflows, grants and data. Nineteen of 25 respondents reported digitalisation or automation and 19 reported uses of AI or data tools. Only two of the 19 respondents reporting digitalisation or automation characterised it primarily as an immediate cost-reduction measure; most described it as serving both financial and broader organisational objectives or as part of an existing transformation process.

This builds on the pattern identified in MOPAN’s 2025 *Doing Better with Less* thematic brief which found that digitalisation, cloud-based ERP systems and automated processes were already reducing some administrative delays and processing costs, while highlighting uneven adoption, fragmented systems and significant transition costs (MOPAN, 2025[42]). The 2026 evidence suggests that these tools are now being used more widely as organisations seek to sustain functions with tighter resource envelopes.

The Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol reported that “*through the new Knowledge Management System (KMS), the full spectrum of the Multilateral Fund’s workflow processes has been automated, and its document management system has been fully digitalized. In addition, the introduction of AI-assisted translation has enabled the Secretariat to achieve immediate cost savings while enhancing the efficiency and timeliness of document processing*” (2026 MOPAN Survey – MLF).

Other organisations are embedding digital tools more deeply in their operating models. Gavi’s digital grant-management system centralizes tracking, submissions, and workflow execution into a fully digitized platform intended to simplify processes while strengthening oversight and accountability (MOPAN Survey, 2026 – Gavi). The Global Fund similarly reported greater use of automation and AI alongside changes to its operating model and decision-making processes (MOPAN Survey, 2026 – Global Fund).

At the same time, digitalisation requires investment before efficiencies can be realised. UNOPS illustrates this constraint: From its inception, the Process Innovation and Digitalization Programme, a multi-year programme that required multi-year financial commitments, had no multi-year funding visibility. Until August 2026, UNOPS had no mechanism for multi-year capital investments, depending on the Executive Board authorisation for use of its own operational reserves. Funding authorisation came in tranches, often a year at a time, which did impact the programme’s ability to efficiently plan and deploy resourcing and investments (UNOPS, 2026[46]). The experience reinforces the 2025 MOPAN efficiency finding that organisations cannot rely on digitalisation to generate savings without adequate transition financing and sustained investment (MOPAN, 2025[42]).

Resource mobilisation, donor diversification and partnerships

Organisations are seeking to diversify both their funding sources and financing mechanisms, through donor diversification efforts, changes in resource-mobilisation strategies and greater use of partnerships. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that where changes in the funding mix are already visible, they can partly offset reductions in traditional donor funding but do not necessarily provide the same flexibility or predictability.

Among survey participants, 18 respondents reported efforts to diversify their donor base, including greater engagement with non-traditional sovereign donors, programme countries, vertical funds, international financial institutions, foundations and private-sector partners. FAO provides one of the clearest examples. With traditional-donor funding expected to fall by around 15% in 2025, it reported increasing reliance on GCF, GEF, the World Bank and ADB. More than 40% of its resources were coming from vertical funds, which helped offset the decline in traditional funding but also reduced flexibility (FAO, 2025[47]).

Organisations are also changing how they mobilise and structure resources, rather than only approaching different donors. Change in resource mobilisation strategies was selected by 15 out of 25 survey respondents. Measures include greater emphasis on flexible and multi-year funding, portfolio and umbrella programmes, pooled and trust funds, private-sector finance, blended instruments and domestic co-financing. FAO, for example, is pursuing portfolio-level planning, umbrella programmes, pooled and trust-fund options and deeper private-sector engagement to improve funding predictability (FAO, 2025[47]). IOM has similarly sought to increase the share of flexible financing available to support integrated programming and enhance organizational resilience and sustainability, including through its Resilience Campaign and greater engagement with donors on unearmarked and softly earmarked funding (IOM, 2026[48]). Increased use of pooled funds, reported by nine survey respondents, also forms part of this wider effort to mobilise resources.

Greater use of partnerships was reported as a response to the funding environment by 15 organisations. These partnerships can combine additional financing with the technical, operational or institutional capabilities of other organisation. For instance, CDB's agreement with the OPEC Fund provides for parallel financing and co-financing alongside technical assistance and knowledge sharing (CARICOM, 2025[49]), while CGIAR's partnership with the OPEC Fund combines development finance with CGIAR's scientific expertise through a new Food Security and Climate Adaptation Facility (CGIAR, 2026[50]). The Global Fund and World Bank have gone further, agreeing to mobilise at least USD 2 billion in joint financing over three years while aligning investments in health systems, public financial management, procurement, supply chains and regional manufacturing (The Global Fund, 2025[51]).

The extent to which these approaches can replace declining traditional funding is not yet clear. Some organisations report that alternative resources or co-financing have helped offset expected losses, but the evidence does not consistently quantify the additional resources generated or isolate their effect from timing, reserves and other financing changes. The composition of funding secured in this way is also important: greater reliance on earmarked vertical funds or tightly projectised funding can reduce flexibility, while new partnerships and financing arrangements may increase transaction and co-ordination costs.

"Traditional donors are, however, down sharply. That is why FAO started to depend more on the GCF, GEF, the World Bank or even the Asian Development Bank. With our traditional donors, we expect to finish the year about 15 percent below last year's total. Donors will need to be re-engaged in a different way, knowing that future support may not return to historical levels. Over 40 percent of our current resources now come from vertical funds. This has helped us absorb the decline. But it also means less flexibility and greater competition entering 2026"
FAO Director-General QU Dongyu, November 2025, Joint Meeting of the Programme and Finance Committees Opening Statement

Effects on delivery and institutional capacity

Key takeaways


- The system is losing both programme coverage and institutional capacity, but the cumulative scale of the impact remains unclear.
- Sharper prioritisation is preserving selected priorities by narrowing coverage, reducing the intensity of support or scaling back enabling functions elsewhere
- Capacity loss extends beyond frontline delivery to normative, policy, technical and knowledge functions.
- Comparative advantage is guiding organisation-level choices more explicitly, but not yet a system-wide division of labour.

The 2026 evidence provides a clearer picture of what "doing less with less" is beginning to mean in practice. Funding reductions are increasingly visible not only in lower expenditure or smaller workforces, but in the trade-offs organisations are facing about which activities to continue, who and where organisations can support, the amount and quality of support provided, and which technical and institutional functions can be sustained. These trade-offs are identified now more concretely. **The evidence does not, however, provide a complete accounting of what has been lost:** impacts are unevenly documented, some will emerge only over time, and activities that were never initiated or expanded are inherently more difficult to observe. The evidence is therefore strongest on direct reductions in coverage, staffing, technical support and programme scope, and weaker on unmet need, foregone expansion and cumulative system-wide capacity loss.

Twenty-three of 25 respondents reported at least one experienced or expected programme-level effect. The remaining two considered the question not applicable to them. No respondent selected "no significant programme-level impact".

Sixteen respondents reported scaling back ongoing projects, 16 reduced programme-delivery targets and 16 reduced ability to scale successful interventions. Fourteen reported reduced ability to respond to emerging crises, while 13 reported cancellation of planned activities, 13 reduced technical support to partners and 13 reduced funding channelled to partners. Twelve reported project suspensions, 11 implementation delays and 10 reduced quality or scope of services.


Figure 10. Funding pressures are translating into widespread reductions in programme scale and delivery



Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions

Fragile and conflict-affected states and lower-income countries are the country categories most frequently identified by respondents as affected by funding reductions. Among the 13 survey respondents able to identify the types of countries most affected by funding reductions, 12 identified fragile and conflict-affected states, 11 low-income countries and 10 lower-middle-income countries. Only four identified upper-middle-income countries and one a high-income country (Figure 11). This broadly mirrors the pattern reported in the 2025 MOPAN Mapping.

Figure 11. Fragile and lower-income countries are most frequently identified as affected by funding reductions



Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions

The result should be interpreted in the context of organisations' mandates and portfolios: many organisations already concentrate a large share of their work in fragile and lower-income settings, so the survey does not establish that these countries are disproportionately affected relative to organisations' existing exposure. It does, however, show that funding reductions are being felt in many of the contexts where needs are high, alternative financing is often more limited and multilateral organisations play substantial delivery, protection or technical-support roles.

Country-level evidence shows how these funding pressures are affecting delivery in high-need settings. WFP reported major reductions across operations including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Syria. In Somalia, emergency food-assistance coverage fell from 2.2 million people in early 2025 to just over 600,000 in February 2026 (WFP, 2026[52]); in Syria, emergency food assistance was halved from 1.3 million to 650,000 people and geographical coverage fell from 14 to seven governorates (WFP, 2026[53]). UNFPA reported that funding reductions in Yemen left almost 1.5 million women without critical health services and 300,000 without gender-based violence services, alongside closures of health facilities, safe spaces and mobile teams (UNFPA, 2026[54]); severe underfunding also led to hyper-prioritisation of essential activities in the Central African Republic (UNFPA, 2026[55]). UNHCR reported substantial reductions in protection and assistance in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Chad and Lebanon (UNHCR, 2026[17]), while IOM reported that a USD 6 million funding gap threatened minimum water, sanitation and flood-protection services for around 187,000 people in South Sudan, in a context of large-scale displacement affecting nearly 1.9 million people (IOM, 2026[56]).

Funding pressures are resulting in sharper prioritisation but the trade-offs differ: some MOs are reducing the number of people, countries or projects supported; others are reducing the level, frequency or quality of support within existing coverage; and some are protecting core outputs by scaling back other activities or functions.

Some organisations are reducing coverage – the number of people, locations, projects or activities supported. For instance, WFP reports that Guinea-Bissau, school-meal coverage fell from 283 400 to around 152 000 children and specialised nutrition support for approximately 56 000 children was suspended (WFP, 2026[57]). UNFPA's evidence similarly shows closures of health facilities, safe spaces and mobile teams across several crisis settings. Gavi's recalibrated 2026–30 programme has reduced or slowed planned vaccine introductions, measles and rubella activities, malaria-vaccine scale-up and health-system investments compared with its original ambition (Gavi, 2025[58]).

Other organisations are maintaining broader coverage while reducing the amount, frequency or quality of support provided. WFP described this distinction explicitly:

“WFP protected its ‘reach’, reaching 121 million beneficiaries, but intensity and quality of assistance were severely impacted.”
(MOPAN survey, 2026 – WFP)

WFP also reported that only 13% of in-kind food parcels met its nutritional-adequacy standard, against an annual target of 80%. (MOPAN survey, 2026 – WFP). UNRWA similarly, maintaining its presence, reduced service delivery by 20%, including shortening the school week from five to four days and clinic opening hours from 40 to 32 hours per week (Le Monde, 2026[59]). UNHCR shows a similar trade-off through cash assistance: the total cash disbursed fell by around 35%, from USD 650 million in 2024 to USD 424 million in 2025, while the number of recipients declined only slightly, resulting in lower levels of support per household. UNHCR reported that 71% of cash recipients could meet only half or less of their basic needs (UNHCR, 2026[17]).

Similarly, WHO has maintained country support while concentrating intensive technical assistance in fragile and priority settings and relying on lighter-touch support elsewhere (WHO, 2026[60]) and OHCHR continued core investigative and Special Procedures work, but with several investigations operating at around half capacity and country visits reduced from two to one per year (OHCHR, 2026[21]).

A third approach is to protect selected priorities by reducing, postponing or discontinuing other activities. The Global Fund's 2025 reprioritisation reduced country allocations by approximately USD 1.43 billion, while donor payments and deferral of selected activities helped maintain essential HIV, tuberculosis and malaria treatment. Reductions were felt more heavily in prevention, training, supervision, technical assistance, oversight and systems-strengthening activities, and emerging gaps were reported in areas including malaria vector control, tuberculosis case-finding and HIV prevention (MOPAN Survey, 2026 – Global Fund) and for GEF a smaller replenishment envelope is translating primarily into tighter allocation choices and lower capacity to expand or scale future programming rather than immediate withdrawal from existing projects (GEF, 2026[61]).

The same approach is visible for WHO protecting core normative, policy and convening functions while reviewing technical products, assessments and deliverables for continuation, scaling down or discontinuation and making intensive country support more selective (WHO, 2026[60]). UNESCO reported postponed, reduced or remotely delivered activities, including conferences, technical assistance, training, missions and policy-planning support, while continuing to deliver a high share of its planned outputs (UNESCO, 2026[23]). FAO reported pressure on both technical and analytical capacity, including a contraction in the country coverage of its Data in Emergencies Monitoring system from a peak of 28 countries to 12, alongside constraints on technical assistance and emergency and resilience work (MOPAN Survey, 2026 – FAO).

These different forms of prioritisation also affect partners. Thirteen survey respondents reported reduced technical support to partners and 13 reduced funding to partners. In some cases, organisations are increasingly relying on governments, local organisations or other multilateral actors to sustain activities previously financed or supported directly. This can preserve elements of delivery, but the effect depends on whether responsibilities are accompanied by sufficient finance, technical capacity and time for transition.

Humanitarian organisations are 'hyper-prioritising'

Organisations are concentrating funding and operational capacity more tightly on the most severely affected populations, locations and immediate life-saving needs. This is producing a narrower and more selective humanitarian response. Among the 17 humanitarian respondents, 13 reported increased focus on the most affected communities or geographic areas, 11 reported an increased focus on the most severe needs and 10 an increased focus on life-saving activities. This reflects the wider move towards what the humanitarian system has termed "hyper-prioritisation": concentrating scarce resources on a smaller set of populations, geographic areas and interventions when available funding cannot cover the full spectrum of assessed needs.

Figure 12. Humanitarian organisations are narrowing their response around the most affected populations and immediate life-saving needs

How organisations are reprioritising humanitarian or crisis-response activities

Assistance value / quantity per beneficiary	0	3	6	6	2
Focus on life-saving activities	10	0	2	4	1
Focus on most affected communities / geographical areas	13	1	0	2	1
Focus on most severe needs	11	0	1	4	1
Preparedness work / Anticipatory action	7	2	1	4	3
Proportion of programmes delivered by partners	1	2	7	4	3
Resilience work	5	4	2	4	2
Use of cash and voucher assistance	2	4	5	5	1
Volume of funding to local and national actors	2	5	4	3	3
	Increased	Reduced	No change	Not applicable	Unable to answer


Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026^[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions

The scale of this prioritisation was already visible in 2025, when the Interagency mid-year appeal narrowed the original Global Humanitarian Overview target from 180 million to 114 million people and the associated financial requirement from around USD 44 billion to USD 29 billion (OCHA, 2025^[11]). This approach continued in the 2026 planning cycle. By the end of April 2026, humanitarian partners had provided at least one form of assistance or protection to an estimated 45.2 million people - around one in six of the more than 252 million people then in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection (OCHA, 2026^[62]).

At the same time, some of the operational capacities needed to identify needs, maintain access and scale a response are themselves under pressure. Field presence and humanitarian access were the capacities most frequently identified as affected, reported by ten respondents, followed by surge and rapid-response capacity (nine), needs assessment and analysis (eight), humanitarian coordination (six), and information management and preparedness (five). Protection and early recovery were the humanitarian sectors most frequently ranked as affected.

Figure 13. Funding cuts are constraining field presence, humanitarian access and surge capacity

Ranking of operational or functional humanitarian capacities most affected by funding cuts



Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026^[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions

While the 'hyper-prioritisation' of humanitarian assistance may be a necessary measure to ensure that limited resources are directed towards the most acute and life-saving needs, it inevitably involves difficult trade-offs. At inter-agency level, prioritisation is informed by collective, multisectoral needs analysis through the Humanitarian Programme Cycle, including the intersectoral severity analysis of the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework, rather than by the severity classification of any single sector. These trade-offs nevertheless reduced geographical coverage, less targeted support for certain vulnerable population groups, and the scaling back of longer-term interventions that are critical for supporting recovery, building resilience, and strengthening preparedness for future crises. WFP has highlighted the risk that people already facing emergency levels of food insecurity but living outside prioritised areas may receive less or no assistance, allowing conditions to deteriorate and potentially increasing the scale and cost of support required later (WFP, 2026^[63]). Country evidence illustrates the wider dynamic: in parts of Mali, reduced food rations were associated with a substantial subsequent increase in acute hunger, while funding gaps elsewhere have forced WFP to reduce assistance before needs themselves have declined (WFP, 2026^[64]).

Trade-offs can also arise as collective priorities are translated into sectoral and programmatic choices. UNFPA has cautioned against an interpretation of life-saving assistance that gives priority to food, water and shelter while treating sexual and reproductive health and protection from gender-based violence as secondary. In its 2026 Humanitarian Action Overview, UNFPA warned that constrained resources were forcing increasingly difficult prioritisation decisions and that entire populations could fall outside the response even while their needs remained acute. It reported that more than 1,000 supported health facilities and mobile teams had closed or were close to closure during 2025, alongside more than 250 safe spaces (UNFPA, 2026^[65]).

This also applies to prevention and anticipatory action. Agricultural support that arrives after a planting season, preparedness that is deferred until after a shock, or assistance withheld until households cross a higher severity threshold may reduce expenditure in the immediate response but increase future humanitarian requirements. The continued investment in anticipatory action reported by several survey respondents therefore represents an attempt to avoid a narrower focus on current severity translating into higher needs later.

However, 'hyper-prioritisation' has not resulted in a uniform retreat from preparedness and resilience programming. Seven survey respondents reported increasing preparedness or anticipatory action, compared with two reporting reductions, while resilience work increased in five organisations and declined in four. Resilience work increased for five and declined for four organisations. This suggests that some organisations may be seeking to protect investments that can prevent needs from worsening even as scarce resources are concentrated on immediate life-saving needs.

FAO and WFP's El Niño appeal, for example, explicitly sought to reach communities before critical agricultural windows closed: available resources could initially cover around 1.2 million people, while a further USD 167 million was required to extend anticipatory support to another 7.6 million people (WFP, 2026^[66]).

Locally-led approaches to crisis response might be more mixed than the sharper focus on immediate needs.

The MOPAN 2025 mapping report found declining support to local partners and warned that funding reductions risked reversing progress towards community ownership and sustainability. In the 2026 results, there is an emerging tension between greater localisation and constrained resources. Local and national actors are being given greater roles in delivery, leadership and partnerships, while the funding and capacity available to fulfil those roles remain uneven. Eight of 25 respondents reported greater use of local actors, and 11 of 17 humanitarian respondents considered devolution and localisation to be advancing through deliberate reform. However, this greater role is not consistently accompanied by more funding. Among humanitarian respondents, five reported reduced funding to local and national actors and only two reported increases. Across the wider sample, 13 organisations reported reductions in funding channelled to partners.

Pooled funding provides an important counterpoint. OCHA, for instance, has sought to increase the share of pooled funding channelled to local actors. By the end of 2025, 55% of Country-Based Pooled Fund allocations had gone to local and national partners, including 17% to local women's organisations. This is the highest proportion ever, with ambitions to do more in 2026 (OCHA, 2025^[11]). FAO reported continuing to invest in people and systems for cash and voucher programming despite the funding constraints, and using OCHA pooled funding to increase financing to national and local actors (2026, MOPAN Survey – FAO).

Normative, policy and knowledge functions continue to be narrowed

Beyond the effects on direct delivery described above, funding reductions are affecting the technical, policy, knowledge and coordination functions through which organisations translate their mandates into support to countries and collective and sustainable results. Looking beyond direct service delivery, the ranking provided by organisations shows substantial pressure across upstream functions. Of the 15 respondents able to provide a substantive ranking, ten included capacity development or technical assistance among the affected functions; eight included knowledge, data and research work, and coordination and partnerships; seven included policy work; six included advocacy and convening; and five included normative work.

This complements the funding-source analysis presented in the previous section: reductions in assessed and flexible resources can have particular implications for functions that are difficult to finance through earmarked projects.

Figure 14. Funding pressures are narrowing technical, knowledge and policy functions

Ranking of functions most affected by funding reductions or funding uncertainty											
Normative work	5	1	1	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-
Policy work	7	1	1	2	2	-	-	-	1	-	-
Knowledge, data and research work	8	2	1	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-
Capacity development or technical assistance	10	2	2	3	2	-	-	1	-	-	-
Direct Service delivery	8	5	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-
Logistics / supply chain	5	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Advocacy	6	-	-	-	1	-	3	2	-	-	-
Convening	6	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	2	1	-
Financing / lending / grant-making	5	2	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-
Coordination and partnership	7	-	1	-	3	2	-	1	-	-	-
Channelling funds to other international organisations	3	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
Channelling funds to national and local actors	6	2	-	2	-	1	-	1	-	-	-
Other, please specify in the next question	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Not applicable	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unable to answer	6	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4	Rank 5	Rank 6	Rank 7	Rank 8	Rank 9	Rank 10

Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026^[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions

UNEP provides a clear example of the breadth of functions exposed. Its Environment Fund and UN Regular Budget both fell below planned levels in 2025, while staffing reductions, recruitment restrictions and expenditure controls accompanied the lower resource envelope. UNEP identified environmental science, environmental law and standards, policy co-ordination, capacity development and convening among the functions supported by these funding streams. Its response has included organisational consolidation, including combining the Early Warning and Assessment Division with the Office of the Chief Scientist to create an Office of Science, alongside a wider functional review intended to preserve priority capabilities under a smaller resource envelope (UNEP, 2025^[67]) (UNEP, 2026^[24]). Similarly, UNESCO reported cancelled regional SDG 4 coordination meetings in Central Africa and the postponement of the SDG4 coordination meeting in the Arab States, while its Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission also entered 2026–27 with a 29% vacancy rate among professional and higher staff, with risks to reporting, systems support and capacity development if additional resources were not secured (UNESCO, 2026^[23]) (UNESCO, 2026^[68]).

WHO has rationalised or discontinued selected clinical-trial platforms, technical tools and assessments, reduced publication volumes and the number of stand-alone technical products, and scaled back support to some inter-agency coordination mechanisms while seeking to protect its core normative mandate (WHO, 2026^[60]).

OHCHR illustrates impacts both on delivery of its human rights mandate and on its wider role in mainstreaming human rights across the UN system. Funding constraints led to postponed reviews of 35 State reports and more than 230 individual complaints, four of eight planned visits by the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture being postponed, and reduced investigative and field capacity. They also affected OHCHR’s system-wide support: requests to deploy Human Rights Advisers to 12 UN Country Teams could not be funded (OHCHR, 2026[21]). This is significant because Human Rights Advisers support Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams to integrate human rights into country analysis, programming, prevention and other UN activities.

These examples are directly linked to MOPAN’s 2025 analysis “Closing the UN Mandate-Results Gap” which found that normative and advisory functions were already under-resourced and that projectised funding creates incentives to favour visible delivery outputs over functions such as policy advice and capacity development (MOPAN, 2025[69]).

Oversight and accountability functions are being deliberately protected, but are not exempt from funding pressures

Organisations appear to be protecting internal oversight, integrity and assurance functions more deliberately. When respondents were asked to rank the oversight functions most affected by funding reductions, uncertainty or related reform measures, 10 of 25 (40%) selected “not applicable” and three were unable to identify an affected function. Across all ranks, monitoring was identified by seven respondents, evaluation by six, and internal audit and ethics by four each.

Open responses provide stronger evidence of deliberate protection among organisations that are making substantial reductions elsewhere. WFP reported prioritising the safeguarding of oversight and independent offices, with their annual budget reduction lower than the average reduction for other functions; it also used central evaluation funding to support country-office evaluations. WHO reported that its corporate accountability functions were largely protected. The ILO stated that the Director-General had ringfenced oversight functions, while UNHCR applied a smaller reduction in staff positions to integrity and management functions than to most other functions and maintained their organisational independence (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]).


Relative protection does not mean that capacity is unchanged. Gavi reported reducing its monitoring and evaluation operating budget by approximately 50% and M&E staffing by 31%, while maintaining funding for independent evaluations (MOPAN Survey, 2026 – Gavi). UNHCR’s Evaluation Office also reported a lower resource envelope and a more selective evaluation programme, including only one new global thematic evaluation planned at the time of reporting (UNHCR Evaluation Office, 2025[70]). WHO likewise preserved the independence of its internal oversight function while reducing vacant posts and investigation consultancy capacity as part of its wider realignment (WHO, 2026[71]).

Cross-cutting commitments are being protected on paper, but implementation capacity is thinner

Cross-cutting commitments are generally being retained in organisational strategies and priorities, but funding pressures are reducing the capacity available to implement them. Gender equality and women’s empowerment was the cross-cutting area most frequently identified as affected, selected by 48% of respondents (12 of 25), followed by “leave no one behind” and inclusion at 44% (11). Human rights or protection and disability inclusion were each identified by 36% (9), while climate or environmental sustainability was identified by 28% (7) and localisation by 24% (6).

The more consistent pattern concerns how these commitments are operationalised. Among the 16 respondents for whom the follow-up question was applicable, pressures were most apparent in the people and capacity needed to translate cross-cutting commitments into practice: nearly two-thirds reported that specialist staff had been reduced or reassigned, more than half reported reduced country-level engagement, and half reported lower mainstreaming capacity. Smaller but still substantial shares reported reductions in dedicated programmes and partner funding, while around one-third reported reduced data collection or monitoring

Figure 15. Funding pressures are reducing the capacity to implement cross-cutting commitments



Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions

For example, the Global Fund reported that the main effect of funding reductions was on the scale and scope of support for these themes rather than the underlying commitments. WHO reported that gender, disability inclusion and human rights were comparatively protected as part of its core normative mandate, although country support became more selective. Gavi retained its formal commitments while reducing specialist capacity, partner funding and some monitoring activities and FAO reported maintaining and strengthening its gender architecture, including an additional senior gender post, while constrained funding reduced the resources available for gender programming, technical support to country offices, staff development and partnerships on inclusion, and specialist capacity for protection mainstreaming (MOPAN survey, 2026).

This is an important qualification to MOPAN’s 2025 finding. Human rights, inclusion and gender commitments are not uniformly “losing ground” as policy objectives, but the infrastructure through which those commitments are delivered – specialist staff, partner support, country engagement, data and monitoring – is under pressure.

Comparative advantage is informing more deliberate organizational prioritisation, but overlaps remain


Organisations are making more considered choices around the reallocation of scarce resources than was visible in 2025, with organisational priorities and comparative advantage increasingly used to guide which functions and thematic areas are protected, reduced or transferred.

Twenty of the 25 respondents reported some change in how they define or operationalise comparative advantage. Eighteen were focusing more clearly on functions where they have a recognised lead role and 17 on thematic areas where they have a recognised lead role, while seven were still reassessing their comparative advantage. Only two reported shifting towards areas primarily because funding was available.

“Funding constraints have reinforced UNHCR’s focus on areas where it has a unique mandate and comparative advantage, particularly international protection, solutions, refugee inclusion advocacy and support to governments.” (MOPAN survey, 2026 – UNHCR)

Figure 16. Comparative advantage is increasingly guiding organisational prioritisation

How funding constraints or reform processes have changed the definition or operationalisation of comparative advantage



Source: (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[15]), Survey of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions

UNHCR, for example, reported that funding constraints had reinforced its focus on international protection, solutions, refugee inclusion, advocacy and support to governments, while relying more on partners for large-scale investment and service delivery (MOPAN Survey, 2026 – UNHCR). FAO has similarly sought to protect functions it considers central to its comparative advantage, including normative and standard-setting work, data and early warning, its country network and transboundary animal-disease response capacity (FAO, 2025[72]) (FAO, 2026[22]).

This represents a clearer element of strategic choice than was apparent in the 2025 mapping, which warned that mandates were at risk of narrowing through attrition, as each organisation identified separate cost-saving measures (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2025[11]). That risk remains. The 2026 evidence shows some organisations increasingly using comparative advantage to guide what functions or priorities they protect or reduce.

However, a recognised lead role does not in itself establish comparative advantage relative to other actors: it may reflect mandate, expertise, institutional experience or country demand. A more systematic assessment would require an impartial consideration of the respective roles and capabilities of different organisations. This is consistent with MOPAN's 2026 brief *Beyond Overlaps: Leveraging Comparative Advantage for Multilateral Collaboration*, which argues that comparative advantage needs to be defined relationally across organisations and linked to shared accountability and funding arrangements, rather than articulated by each organisation in isolation (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026[73]).

Focus on perceived comparative advantage is visible in some cases, but systematic division of labour remains unclear. Some organisations are going beyond internal prioritisation by considering who else is better placed to perform a function and adjusting their roles accordingly to reduce duplication. In the survey, ten organisations reported reducing activities where other actors may be better placed, but concrete examples of reallocation through a relational assessment of comparative advantage remain limited.

WHO has reduced overlap in areas where another UN entity has a clearer mandate or stronger delivery role, while retaining normative and technical responsibilities. Examples include stepping back from parts of sexual and reproductive health and protection-related delivery where UNFPA or UNICEF are better placed, and transferring selected logistics, training and innovation functions to other providers (WHO, 2026[60]). WHO asked UNFPA to lead the SRH Task Team at global level and to coordinate SRH working groups under the Health Clusters at country level, while UNFPA will continue to manage the distribution of IARH kits.

UNAIDS is transferring 11 of its 15 former Secretariat functions to its Cosponsors, rather than simply discontinuing them (UNAIDS, 2026[35]). Separately, UNCTAD and DESA are co-leading work on joint knowledge hubs and macro-economic analysis, including a joint commodities and governance team with the Economic Commission for Africa and a consolidated flagship publication (UNCTAD, 2026[74]) (UNCTAD, 2026).

A similar logic is emerging within the global health architecture. The Global Fund reported a more deliberate division of labour with partners including Gavi, the World Bank and Africa CDC, distinguishing areas where it should lead, partner or rely on other actors. Gavi similarly described clearer role definition and “merging at the last mile” where joint approaches can improve country-level delivery (MOPAN Survey, 2026 – Global Fund and Gavi).

These examples are different from simply cutting lower-priority activities. They involve an assessment of whether another organisation or system is better positioned to perform the function. The available evidence does not show that this approach is being applied consistently across the system or that all transfers are accompanied by an assessment of the finance and capacity needed by the receiving actor. Moreover, refocusing on perceived comparative advantage at the organisational level still falls short of an examination of comparative advantage across the system that could lead to a redefinition of the division of labour.

There is limited evidence that the functions and geographies that organisations leave are being covered by others. The evidence shows that organisations are reducing, discontinuing or transferring some functions and geographic presence, but there is not yet a systematic picture of whether other actors, including governments, local or national actors, or NGOs not captured by the survey, are able to fill the resulting gaps. As documented in preceding sections, organisational adjustment has included reduced programme coverage, office closures and consolidation, narrower technical and analytical capacity and, in some cases, explicit transfer of functions. The relevant question is therefore not whether exits are occurring, but whether they form part of a coherent redistribution of roles.

None of the 25 respondents reported that their organisation was taking on functions or spaces vacated by another actor. This does not mean that no substitution is occurring: responsibilities may be taken on by governments, NGOs or organisations, without this being visible in the survey data.

The humanitarian responses provide a more direct indication of the potential risk. Of the 17 humanitarian organisations answering whether they were withdrawing from a function, sector or geography that they believed no other actor was positioned to cover, three said yes, five said no and six considered it too early to assess. The high level of uncertainty is itself relevant: in a rapidly changing funding environment, organisations may be reducing or exiting roles before it is clear who, if anyone, will absorb the function.

Taken together, the evidence suggests that many organisations are narrowing their focus around functions and areas where they see themselves as having a recognised lead role. This could result in reduced duplication and some efficiency gains. However, because funding and capacity are declining across several organisations at the same time, functions or geographies they leave are unlikely to be fully picked up by others. The result is therefore likely to be some loss of collective coverage and system-wide capacity.

*“Funding constraints and ongoing global health reform discussions have reinforced the Global Fund’s focus on its comparative advantages rather than fundamentally changing them. (...) The Global Fund is also pursuing a more deliberate division of labor with partners, emphasizing collaboration to reduce duplication and fragmentation, clarifying where it should lead, where it should partner, and where other actors are better placed”.
The Global Fund (2026 MOPAN Survey)*

Cost cutting measures packaged as reform

Key takeaways

- Funding-driven adjustment is increasingly being presented as reform implementation, particularly around efficiency and prioritisation
- The more structural elements of reform are not yet keeping pace with organisation-level adjustment.
- Cost reduction should not itself be treated as evidence of successful reform; the test is whether capability, service quality, coherence and clearer roles are preserved or improved

Persistent funding pressure is moving organisations beyond short-term cost saving measures towards deeper organisational restructuring, and many of these measures are increasingly packaged as reform implementation. Many of the implemented measures were not initiated by system-wide reform initiatives. Some measures pre-dated UN80 and formed part of existing organisational reform processes; others were triggered directly by the funding contraction; and some have subsequently been incorporated into or presented through wider reform agendas. This is more evident around efficiency measures and prioritisation of delivery than structural change or programmatic redistributions across the system.

Survey responses provide an overview of how organisations themselves characterise the purpose of these measures. Across 280 measure-level responses, 137 (49%) were described as serving both immediate cost reduction and a reform agenda. Thirty-five (13%) were classified primarily as immediate cost reduction, 23 (8%) primarily as a response to reform, and 64 (23%) as “other”, often because the measure pre-dated the current funding pressures or formed part of continuous organisational improvement. The combined purpose was especially common for workforce restructuring, office consolidation, relocation, programme prioritisation, streamlining roles and responsibilities, and digitalisation. Hiring freezes were more clearly linked to immediate cost reduction (MOPAN survey, 2026).

This provides an additional dimension to the picture gathered by MOPAN in 2025. The earlier mapping found that organisational adjustment was moving faster than reform. In 2026, financial pressures continue to drive immediate organisational decisions, while the more structural and collective elements of reform remain slower. What is different in 2026 is that measures introduced for financial or pre-existing organisational reasons are increasingly being described and taken forward within wider reform frameworks.

The implementation of these cost-cutting measures does not itself demonstrate implementation of the broader reform objectives. Workforce restructuring, relocation, consolidation or digitalisation can contribute to reduce expenditure and may also support the efficiency component of the reform agendas, but concentrating implementation on these measures can leave wider questions of effectiveness, coherence of delivery, division of labour and the preservation of essential system capabilities only partially addressed.

The relationship between funding pressure and reform varies across organisations. In some cases, financial constraints have directly triggered organisational change; in others, they have accelerated reforms already under way or led organisations to align existing adaptation processes with wider reform agendas.

UNAIDS illustrates how funding-driven adjustment can subsequently align with a wider reform process. Its first phase of transition in response to a changing financing began before UN80. Following the Secretary-General's UN80 direction in 2025, UNAIDS explicitly aligned this phase with the wider reform agenda through a deliberate redistribution of responsibilities, alongside a smaller Secretariat, reduced country footprint, regionalisation and relocation of functions. The subsequent phase is broader still, considering mandate delivery, governance, financing and the future institutional configuration of the Joint Programme (UNAIDS, 2026^[35]).

WHO's prioritisation and realignment process was directly accelerated by the loss of assessed and voluntary funding, but developed into a broader operating framework: protect and enhance the core; scale down and stop; consolidate; collaborate; and digitalise. This framework links resources, deliverables and workforce decisions and includes explicit role differentiation with other organisations (WHO, 2026^[60]).

UNHCR's immediate workforce and footprint reductions were more directly associated with the funding contraction. Its subsequent management review has a broader scope, addressing accountability, budget reform, alignment between headquarters, regional bureaux and country operations, and duplication (UNHCR, 2025^[75]) (UNHCR, 2026^[76]).

For the Global Fund and Gavi, cost-reduction measures are increasingly being integrated into broader reform and transformation programmes. At the Global Fund, the changing financing environment has reinforced and accelerated ongoing transformation efforts, alongside programmatic shifts approved through its governance processes. Gavi has also combined programme reprioritisation and cost reduction with grant-management reform, country ownership, digitalisation, sustainability and clearer partnership roles. These organisations are not part of UN80, but they are adapting within a wider multilateral reform environment (MOPAN Survey 2026 – Gavi; The Global Fund).

The relevant measure is therefore not whether an organisation labels a measure as reform, but whether implementation delivers the wider associated result. A workforce restructuring, relocation or consolidation may simultaneously reduce expenditure and support a more efficient operating model. Conversely, the same measure could reduce capacity without achieving the wider objectives associated with reform. The relevant question is therefore increasingly not whether an initiative is described as “reform”, but what changes it produces in efficiency, capability, service quality, coherence and division of labour.

UN80 implementation is most visible in efficiency and common operational services

The areas of UN80 reform most closely aligned with immediate efficiency and financial pressures are moving into implementation more visibly than reforms that require a system-wide redistribution of programmes, roles or institutional structures. Workforce restructuring, digitalisation and automation, consolidation of shared services, streamlined processes, relocation and office consolidation are among the measures most widely reported by organisations.

This is particularly visible in common services. Shared services, common back offices and common premises pre-date UN80 and have been long-standing elements of UN reform. UN80 is bringing several previously separate initiatives into a single Unified Services Roadmap covering procurement and supply chains, finance, ICT, logistics, human resources and administration. Its stated objective is to reduce fragmentation in support services and make them more cost-effective, including by scaling common back offices so that country-level operational support can be delivered with less duplication.

Previous sections show that this is one of the few areas where there is already some evidence of results. Mature arrangements such as UNDP's GSSC, WFP's shared services and UNOPS' global shared services, report transaction volumes, service-performance indicators and realised efficiencies.

There is much less evidence of improved coherence through structural and programmatic realignment, including clearer division of labour, reduced duplication and, where appropriate, consolidation of functions or entities. As the preceding analysis of comparative advantage showed, organisations are increasingly making choices about their own priorities, but there are relatively few examples of functions being deliberately reassigned between organisations. More broadly, programme realignment, redistribution of functions, mergers and other structural options remain more often at the stage of assessment, consultation or proposal than completed implementation.

The same applies to geographic reconfiguration. Organisations are consolidating or relocating their own offices and functions, but the evidence does not yet show a systematic system-wide reconfiguration in which geographic presence is planned collectively. Similarly, none of the survey respondents reported taking on functions or spaces vacated by another organisation, while some humanitarian respondents reported withdrawing from areas where they were uncertain that another actor could provide coverage. The evidence therefore points to more progress in making individual organisations leaner or reducing duplicated support functions than in collectively agreeing on a division of labour around substantive responsibilities across the system.

The Humanitarian Reset is managing funding reductions, while broader reform is advancing more unevenly

Funding pressures are shaping how the Humanitarian Reset is being implemented. The Humanitarian Reset is most clearly visible in how organisations are managing a smaller resource base: through sharper prioritisation, simpler planning and leaner coordination. Its broader ambitions to change how the system works – including localisation, clearer division of labour, stronger country leadership and more integrated operational approaches – are also advancing, but less consistently and with more limited evidence of results.

Survey respondents generally characterised the main components of the Reset as advancing through deliberate reform rather than simply being scaled back. Across six reform areas and 17 humanitarian respondents, 53% of the 102 responses described the area as advancing through deliberate reform, while only three described it as scaling back because of funding cuts. This was most common for devolution and localisation, identified as advancing through deliberate reform by 11 respondents, and role clarity and complementarity, identified by ten. Prioritisation and planning, coordinated and principled delivery, and shared services and system efficiency were each identified by nine.

Organisations report overlapping objectives driving changes to humanitarian activities. Of 69 applicable classifications, 59% were described as resulting from a combination of drivers, rather than from strategic prioritisation, reform alignment or cost cutting alone (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2026^[15]). ‘Hyper-prioritisation’ is the clearest example on how the Reset is organising a collective response to severe funding constraints, directing scarce resources towards the most urgent needs, while recognising that many other needs will remain unmet.

UNICEF’s experience illustrates the consequences of this constrained prioritisation. It describes the severe funding cuts of early 2025 as having accelerated the Humanitarian Reset and subsequently revised its humanitarian targets and financial requirements in line with the Reset and inter-agency prioritisation. Its definition of hyper-prioritisation explicitly combines an assessment of who is most in need with who can realistically be reached given available resources, capacity and operating conditions (UNICEF, 2026^[77]).

There is also evidence that the Reset is changing some ways of working. Humanitarian planning has been simplified: the Humanitarian Programme Cycle was shortened by 51 days and core planning documents by 67%, with the stated objective of reducing administrative burden on country teams and partners (OCHA, 2026^[78]). Respondents also reported deliberate progress on role clarity, coordinated delivery, localisation and shared services.

The evidence is more mixed, however, when these reform directions are compared with changes in operational capacity. Devolution and localisation provide the clearest example. Organisations report deliberate progress in shifting leadership and roles towards national and local actors, but survey evidence shows that financing to those actors remains under pressure. While localisation encompasses other dimensions beyond transfer of funding, such as changes to leadership, decision-making and partnership practices, the extent to which these can progress in the face of shrinking resource flows is unclear. Similarly, efforts to simplify structures and clarify roles are taking place while organisations report pressure on field presence, humanitarian access, surge capacity, needs assessment and coordination.

The evidence therefore points to uneven progress across the different ambitions of the Humanitarian Reset. The clearest convergence between funding adjustment and reform is currently visible in prioritisation, simplified processes and operational efficiency. There is evidence of wider change in localisation, coordination and role clarity, but less evidence so far that these changes have consistently produced a deeper redistribution of resources, clearer division of labour or stronger local capacity.

Conclusions

The funding crisis that started in 2025 has continued, although the pace of global ODA reductions is expected to slow. Organisations report realised income reductions as well as expectations of further pressure, and several are planning against lower-resource scenarios extending into future funding cycles. OECD projections point to a further decline in 2026 and continued downward pressure beyond it, but at a slower rate than in 2025. Some organisations experienced smaller near-term reductions than initially expected, including through exceptional contributions, reserve use, diversified funding or other buffers, however this reflects temporary mitigation or changes in the composition of funding rather than an improvement in the underlying funding position. The outlook remains uncertain.

Impact remains uneven across different types of multilateral organisations. The most significant consequences are visible among UN entities and other organisations that depend heavily on voluntary or assessed contributions, where lower funding has translated directly into workforce reductions, programme cuts and changes in institutional capacity. Funding pressure is also spreading to global funds and partnerships, principally through smaller future programme envelopes and tighter allocation choices. MDBs have so far experienced the contraction differently: ordinary-capital operations are less directly exposed to annual ODA reductions, while recent replenishments suggest that some concessional windows have been comparatively protected through donor allocation choices and greater leverage.

The type of funding being reduced is a key determinant of where the impact is felt within organisations. Findings show that reductions in earmarked funding are associated most strongly with programme delivery and technical assistance, while reductions in assessed and flexible core resources are more closely associated with policy, normative, evidence and other institutional functions. Organisations are seeking to mitigate these pressures through donor diversification, philanthropic and private-sector funding, pooled and vertical funds, co-financing and other resource-mobilisation approaches. In some organisations, alternative sources and mechanisms have offset part of the shortfall, but the evidence does not yet show that they can do so consistently or at sufficient scale. They may also provide less flexibility or predictability than the resources they replace.

Short-term cost-cutting measures are increasingly giving way to more structural organisational readjustments. Hiring freezes, expenditure controls and other immediate containment measures remain in use, but organisations are increasingly combining them with workforce restructuring, consolidation or relocation of functions, shared services, digitalisation, changes in programme portfolios and more deliberate prioritisation of organisational roles. In several cases, these measures are changing organisational structures and operating models rather than just reducing expenditure.

The evidence collected for this mapping shows more clearly that funding contraction is reducing programme reach and workforce, but also institutional capabilities, although the cumulative system-wide picture remains incomplete. Organisations are supporting fewer people, countries or activities in some areas; reducing the amount, frequency or quality of support in others; and protecting selected priorities by scaling back technical assistance, evidence, surge capacity, partner support or other enabling functions. Humanitarian organisations are concentrating increasingly scarce resources on the most severe needs, while normative, policy and knowledge functions are also being narrowed in several organisations. However, they still provide only a partial account: the evidence does not capture systematically what activities were never initiated, which programmes were not expanded, what needs went unmet, or the cumulative effect of reductions in institutional and system-wide capacity.

Cost-cutting and organisational adjustment measures are increasingly being packaged as reform implementation. Under UN80, this is most visible in shared and common services, digitalisation, consolidation, relocation and process simplification, many of which pre-date UN80 or were accelerated by financial pressure. Under the Humanitarian Reset, funding constraints are shaping implementation through sharper prioritisation and simpler planning, while progress on broader objectives such as localisation, clearer division of labour and stronger country leadership is more uneven.

The more structural elements of reform have not kept pace with organisational-level adjustments and efficiency measures. Decisions on what organisations protect, reduce or discontinue are increasingly informed by their self-assessed comparative advantage, but they are not yet being made through a system-wide assessment of division of labour or the capacity the multilateral system needs to retain. This is consistent with the slower progress of UN80 Workstream 3 work packages where many proposals on programme and structural realignment remain under development, and with reform of the global health architecture, which is only beginning to address roles, comparative advantage and financing. The result is therefore clearer and sharper prioritisation within individual organisations without a corresponding system-wide redistribution of functions and capacity.

Issues to consider as reform progresses

In 2025, MOPAN identified a set of implications to be considered by Member States and Multilateral Organisations as reform discussions moved forward. These remain valid and are reinforced by the 2026 findings. For organisations, the 2025 report called for efficiency and restructuring measures to be aligned with mandate priorities, coordinated with other entities, and designed to protect core policy, knowledge and evaluation functions, while supporting localisation and partnerships. For Member States, it emphasised the need for a shared vision of system-wide coherence, predictable and quality funding, monitoring of the cumulative effects of organisation-level measures, and use of independent evidence to inform the sequencing of reform (Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN), 2025^[1]).

The 2026 stocktake provides a clearer picture of how funding reductions are affecting organisational capacity and how adaptation is interacting with wider reform agendas. The implications below therefore build on the 2025 recommendations, focusing on the additional actions now needed from Member States and governing bodies, and from multilateral organisation management, as restructuring and system-wide reform move forward.

For multilateral organisations

- **Base restructuring on the capabilities needed to deliver the organisation's mandate and comparative advantage.** Workforce, footprint and programme decisions should identify which functions need to be protected and where another actor is demonstrably better placed to deliver. This extends the 2025 recommendation to align restructuring with mandate priorities by requiring organisations to consider their role in relation to the wider system.
- **Consider the systemic impact of reducing or withdrawing from activities.** Before reducing or exiting a function or location, organisations should assess how the change may affect the work of other actors, overall coverage and essential system functions. Such changes should be planned in dialogue with multilateral, national, local and non-governmental partners to minimise disruption and avoid compounding reductions elsewhere.
- **Demonstrate whether adaptation measures are delivering the intended reform result.** Management should monitor not only savings from restructuring, relocation, digitalisation or shared services, but also effects on service quality, expertise, country support and organisational capability.

For MOPAN members and other governors and donors

- **Establish what capacity and reach remain in the system before taking further structural decisions.** The evidence now shows reductions in programme coverage, technical expertise, normative functions, crisis-response capacity and country presence, but there is no consolidated picture of these changes across the system. Member States and other members of governing bodies should require organisations and system-wide reform processes to map what has been reduced or discontinued, where capacity remains, and where several organisations may be withdrawing from the same functions or locations. This should inform the next phase of UN80 structural and programme realignment and other system-wide reform processes.
- **Accelerate rationalisation based on comparative advantage, while protecting the core functions the system still needs.** Further consolidation should be based on a system-wide assessment of comparative advantage rather than separate organisation-level cuts. UN80 structural changes and programmatic realignments provide an opportunity to move from individual prioritisation towards clearer decisions about which organisations should lead, support, share or exit particular functions. Similar analysis will be needed as reform of the global health architecture develops. Rationalisation should identify the capabilities that need to be preserved across the system.
- **Align funding type with the core functions expected to be sustained.** Targeted or one-off contributions can help prevent the closure of individual programmes, but they do not replace flexible and predictable resources that allow organisations to maintain core expertise, evidence, normative functions, crisis-response capacity and other institutional capabilities. Funding decisions should therefore consider both the volume and type of resources provided, particularly where Member States expect organisations to remain resilient while restructuring.
- **Assess reform against its intended objectives, not simply the measures implemented.** The 2026 evidence shows the closest alignment between organisational adaptation measures and reform shared and common services, digitalisation and consolidation under UN80, and hyper-prioritisation and simplification under the Humanitarian Reset. Member States should assess whether these measures actually reduce duplication, preserve service quality and capability, strengthen localisation or clarify roles, as relevant to the broader reform objectives. Cost savings, smaller structures or narrower programmes should not in themselves be treated as evidence of successful reform.

Opportunities for further analysis

The 2026 stocktake provides a stronger evidence base on how multilateral organisations are adapting to sustained financial constraint, but several questions require continued monitoring. Some effects can only be understood through longitudinal analysis rather than a single stocktake.

Further analysis could examine what activities were never initiated, expanded or scaled because resources were unavailable, alongside reductions that are directly observable; whether workforce restructuring, relocation and changes in geographic presence affect service quality, technical capacity and institutional knowledge over time; whether reported efficiency gains remain positive once transition, restructuring and investment costs are taken into account; and whether functions or geographies vacated by one organisation are absorbed elsewhere or contribute to cumulative gaps in system coverage and capacity.

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Annex A. MOPAN Survey: 2026 Mapping of measures taken by multilateral organisations in response to global funding reductions

Section 1. Identifying Information

Name of your organisation or entity: *[Auto-filled]*

1.1 Do you consent MOPAN to publish your responses? (Note that if you do not consent, the information you provide will be shared with MOPAN members only)

- ☐ Yes, I allow MOPAN to publish my responses
☐ No, I don't

Respondent details

1.2 Please provide the name, title, unit and email address of the main respondent (To follow-up if needed)

1.3 Which category best describes your organisation or entity? [Multiple answer possible]

- ☐ UN Secretariat department, office or entity
☐ UN fund or programme
☐ UN specialised agency
☐ Other UN-related organisation
☐ International Financial Institution
☐ Concessional window or fund linked to an IFI or MDB
☐ Trust fund / financial intermediary fund
☐ Vertical fund
☐ Global or multi-stakeholder partnership
☐ ICRC
☐ Other:

1.4 Which of the following best describes your organisation's operating model? Please select all that apply.

- ☐ Direct implementation / service delivery
☐ Norms and standard-setting
☐ Policy advice
☐ Capacity development / technical assistance
☐ Financing (loans and grants)
☐ Convening / coordination / partnership platform
☐ Procurement / supply chain / operational services
☐ Research, data or evidence generation
☐ Other, please specify

1.4.a Additional details in response to the previous question:

1.5 Does your organisation respond to humanitarian crises?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

Section 2. Funding outlook and magnitude

2.1 Please indicate the scale of funding reduction that affected your organisation in 2025, compared with the previous equivalent year or cycle.

- ☐ 1–10%
☐ 11–20%
☐ 21–30%
☐ 31–40%
☐ 41–50%
☐ 51% or greater
☐ No funding reduction
☐ Not applicable
☐ Unable to answer

2.1.a Please provide any additional details:

2.2 Has your organisation received formal notice of funding reductions, contribution withdrawals, lower pledges or reduced replenishment expectations? (multiple answer possible)

- ☐ Yes, for 2026
☐ Yes, for 2027
☐ Yes, beyond 2027
☐ Yes, for the next replenishment or capital cycle
☐ No formal notice, but informal indications of reductions
☐ No
☐ Unable to answer
☐ Other, please specify

2.2.a Please provide any additional details:

2.3 Please estimate the scale of the estimated funding reduction for next budget or replenishment relative to your previous one:

- ☐ 1–10%
☐ 11–20%
☐ 21–30%
☐ 31–40%
☐ 41–50%
☐ 51% or greater
☐ No funding reduction expected
☐ Not applicable
☐ Unable to answer

2.3.a Additional details:

2.4 Where available, please provide the absolute value of the funding reduction, shortfall or increase, for the relevant year or cycle. Please indicate the currency used.

- ☐ 2025: [Open text]
- ☐ 2026: [Open text]
- ☐ 2027: [Open text]
- ☐ Next replenishment / budget cycle:
- ☐ Other, please specify (Not applicable, Unable to answer...)

2.5 If your organisation is currently facing or has received formal notice of funding reductions in the next budget or replenishment cycle, please **rank up to three** funding sources most affected

- ☐ Assessed contributions
- ☐ Voluntary core / regular resources
- ☐ Voluntary earmarked / non-core contributions
- ☐ Replenishment resources
- ☐ Capital contributions
- ☐ Concessional resources
- ☐ Trust fund resources
- ☐ Programme / project fees
- ☐ Service income or implementation fees
- ☐ Investment income
- ☐ Borrowing / market-based financing
- ☐ Other, please specify in the next question
- ☐ Not applicable
- ☐ Unable to answer

2.5.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is "Other":

Section 3. Impact of funding reductions

3.1 For each selected funding source in the previous questions, please indicate the main areas where impacts are being felt.

Funding source	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3
Programme delivery	☐	☐	☐
Normative work	☐	☐	☐
Policy advice	☐	☐	☐
Technical assistance	☐	☐	☐
Financing / grants / lending	☐	☐	☐
Staffing	☐	☐	☐
Geographic presence	☐	☐	☐
Partnerships	☐	☐	☐
Data / monitoring / evidence	☐	☐	☐
Corporate functions	☐	☐	☐
Unable to answer / Don't know	☐	☐	☐

3.1.a Additional details in response to the previous question:

3.2 Please rank, by level of impact, the functions most affected by funding reductions or funding uncertainty.

- | | |
|---|---|
| ☐ Normative work | ☐ Financing / lending / grant-making |
| ☐ Policy work | ☐ Coordination and partnership |
| ☐ Knowledge, data and research work | ☐ Channelling funds to other international organisations |
| ☐ Capacity development or technical assistance | ☐ Channelling funds to national and local actors |
| ☐ Direct Service delivery | ☐ Other, please specify in the next question |
| ☐ Logistics / supply chain | ☐ Not applicable |
| ☐ Advocacy | ☐ Unable to answer |
| ☐ Convening | |

3.2.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is "Other"

3.3 Please rank by level of impact the corporate functions most affected by funding reductions, funding uncertainty or related reform measures, where 1 = most affected

- | | |
|--|---|
| ☐ Human resources management | ☐ Fundraising and donor relations |
| ☐ Procurement | ☐ Governance and member engagement |
| ☐ Risk management | ☐ Other: [Open text field] |
| ☐ Strategic planning and performance management | ☐ Not applicable |
| ☐ Evidence generation (data, monitoring and evaluation) | ☐ Unable to answer |
| ☐ IT systems and digital transformation | |
| ☐ Capital investments (e.g. office infrastructure, physical assets) | |

3.3.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is “Other”

3.4 Please rank by level of impact the oversight functions most affected by funding reductions, funding uncertainty or related reform measures

- ☐ Internal audit
- ☐ Monitoring
- ☐ Evaluation
- ☐ Ethics
- ☐ Other, please specify in the next question
- ☐ Not applicable
- ☐ Unable to answer

3.4.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is “Other”

3.5 Which programme or project-level effects has your organisation experienced or does it expect to experience?

- | | |
|---|---|
| ☐ Suspension of projects or activities | ☐ Reduced ability to respond to emerging crises / reduced surge capacity |
| ☐ Cancellation of planned projects or activities | ☐ Reduced ability to scale up successful interventions |
| ☐ Scaling back of ongoing projects | ☐ Reduced ability to sustain results after project closure |
| ☐ Delays in implementation | ☐ No significant programme-level impact |
| ☐ Reduced programme delivery targets | ☐ Not applicable |
| ☐ Reduced quality or scope of services | ☐ Unable to answer |
| ☐ Reduced technical support to partners | ☐ Other: |
| ☐ Reduced funds channelled to partners | |

3.5.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is “Other”

Section 4. Adaptation measures

Which measures has your organisation taken, or is planning to take, to respond to funding constraints or preserve effectiveness?

- | | |
|--|---|
| ☐ Staff reductions | ☐ Greater use of partnerships |
| ☐ Hiring freeze | ☐ Greater use of local actors |
| ☐ Workforce restructuring | ☐ Donor diversification |
| ☐ Office closure or consolidation | ☐ Change in resource mobilisation strategy |
| ☐ Relocation to lower-cost locations | ☐ Increased use of pooled funds |
| ☐ Internal consolidation of common/shared services within the organisation | ☐ Increased cost recovery |
| ☐ Increased use of common/shared services provided jointly or by other organisations | ☐ Changes in delivery modality |
| ☐ Digitalisation or automation | ☐ Scenario planning or contingency planning |
| ☐ Use of AI or data tools | ☐ Use of reserves |
| ☐ Prioritisation or consolidation across programmes, crisis contexts, or target populations | ☐ Risk appetite review |
| ☐ Exit from selected activities, sectors or geographies | ☐ Changes in governance or member engagement |
| | ☐ Streamlining roles and responsibilities |
| | ☐ No measures taken |
| | ☐ Not applicable |
| | ☐ Unable to answer |
| | ☐ Other: [Open text] |

4.5.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is “Other”

4.1 For each measure selected in the previous question, please indicate its main purpose.

Measure	Immediate cost reduction	Response to reform agenda	Both	Unable to answer	Other
Option1	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Option 2	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Option 3	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

4.1.a Additional details in response the previous question

4.2 What implications, if any, do ongoing reform processes (including the Humanitarian Reset, UN80 Initiative, MDB Roadmap) have for how your organisation has adapted to the changing financing environment?

Section 5. Geographical impact

5.1 Which categories of countries are being most impacted by the funding reductions? (multiple responses possible)

- ☐ Low-Income Countries (LICs)
- ☐ Lower-Middle-Income Countries (LMICs)
- ☐ Upper-Middle-Income Countries (UMICs)
- ☐ High-Income Countries (HICs)
- ☐ Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS)
- ☐ Not applicable
- ☐ Unable to answer

5.2 Has your organisation changed, or is it planning to change, its geographical footprint *since 2025*? (multiple answer)

Office type	Closure	Reduction	Consolidation	Expansion	Relocation	No significant change	Unable to answer
Country offices	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Sub-regional offices	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regional offices	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Multi-country offices	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Liaison/ representation office	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Thematic/technical/knowledge hubs	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Shred service centers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

5.2.a Additional details in response the previous question

5.3 How has the change in geographical footprint affected the following capacities?

Capacity area	Protected / prioritised	Reduced	Centralised	Regionalised	Externalised / outsourced	Expanded	No change
Technical expertise	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Policy expertise	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Normative expertise	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Logistics	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Crisis response / surge capacity	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Data, monitoring and evaluation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Oversight, audit, ethics, investigation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Partnership management	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Resource mobilisation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Procurement / supply chain	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

- ☐ Unable to answer
- ☐ Not applicable

5.4 Please describe the main rationale behind any changes to geographical footprint or deployment of expertise. Where relevant, please explain expected trade-offs between efficiency, proximity to country realities, responsiveness, technical quality and risk management

5.5 Which regions are being most directly impacted by the funding reductions?

- ☐ Northern Africa
- ☐ Western Africa
- ☐ Central (Middle) Africa
- ☐ Eastern Africa
- ☐ Southern Africa
- ☐ Northern America
- ☐ Caribbean
- ☐ Central America
- ☐ South America
- ☐ Central Asia
- ☐ Eastern Asia
- ☐ South-Eastern Asia
- ☐ Southern Asia
- ☐ Western Asia
- ☐ Eastern Europe
- ☐ Northern Europe
- ☐ Southern Europe
- ☐ Western Europe
- ☐ Australia and New Zealand
- ☐ Melanesia
- ☐ Micronesia
- ☐ Polynesia
- ☐ Not applicable
- ☐ Unable to answer

Section 6. Workforce and staffing

6.1 Has your organisation implemented or planned any of the following workforce-related measures since 2025?

- | | |
|--|--|
| ☐ Staff layoffs | ☐ Voluntary unpaid leave |
| ☐ Abolishment of posts | ☐ Relocation of staff or functions |
| ☐ Hiring freeze | ☐ Increased use of short-term personnel |
| ☐ Non-renewal of temporary or fixed-term contracts | ☐ Increased use of outsourcing |
| ☐ Reduced working hours (temporary or permanent) | ☐ No workforce-related measures |
| ☐ Reduction in consultants | ☐ Not applicable |
| ☐ Voluntary separation or early retirement packages | ☐ Unable to answer |
| | ☐ Other, please specify |

6.1.a Additional details in response to the previous question

6.2 Where workforce reductions or restructuring have occurred, which categories have been most affected?

- | | |
|---|--|
| ☐ Entry-level professionals | ☐ Field services |
| ☐ Mid-level professionals | ☐ Not applicable |
| ☐ Senior-level professionals | ☐ Unable to answer |
| ☐ Consultants | ☐ Field services |
| ☐ National Officers | ☐ Other, please specify |
| ☐ General services | |

6.2.a For the selected categories, please select the estimated level of impact:

Category	Limited (1-10%)	Moderate (11-25%)	High 26-50%	Very high (over 50%)	Unable to answer
Choice 1	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Choice 2	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Choice 3	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

6.2.b Please provide any additional details if available, including estimates of the share of personnel or posts reduced since 1 January 2025, or on restructuring effects other than reductions.

6.3 Does your organisation have data on whether workforce reductions or restructuring have had differentiated effects by gender?

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| ☐ Yes | ☐ Not applicable |
| ☐ Partially | ☐ Unable to answer |
| ☐ No | |

6.3.a If yes or partially, please summarise the main patterns:

Section 7. Comparative advantage

7.1 Have funding constraints or reform processes changed how your organisation defines or operationalises its comparative advantage? [multiple answers possible]

- | |
|---|
| ☐ Yes, we are focusing more clearly on thematic areas where we have a recognised lead role |
| ☐ Yes, we are focusing more clearly on functions where we have a recognised lead role |
| ☐ Yes, we are reducing activities where other actors may be better placed |
| ☐ Yes, we are taking on functions or spaces vacated by other actors |
| ☐ Yes, we are shifting toward areas where funding is available |
| ☐ Yes, we are reassessing our comparative advantage but changes are not yet implemented |
| ☐ No significant change |
| ☐ Not applicable |
| ☐ Unable to answer |
| ☐ Other, please specify |

7.1.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is "Other" [Optional Open Text]

Section 8. Cross-cutting issues affected

8.1 Have funding constraints affected your organisation's ability to deliver on cross-cutting commitments?

- | |
|--|
| ☐ Gender equality and women's empowerment |
| ☐ SEAH |
| ☐ Human rights / Protection |
| ☐ Disability inclusion |
| ☐ Leave no one behind / inclusion |
| ☐ Climate / environmental sustainability |
| ☐ HDP nexus |
| ☐ Localisation |
| ☐ No significant impact |
| ☐ Not applicable |
| ☐ Unable to answer |
| ☐ Other, please specify |

8.1.a Additional details in response to the previous question [Optional Open Text]

8.2 Where cross-cutting priorities are affected, what is the nature of the impact?

- ☐ Dedicated programmes reduced or discontinued
- ☐ Mainstreaming capacity reduced
- ☐ Specialist staff reduced or reassigned
- ☐ Partner funding reduced
- ☐ Data collection or monitoring reduced
- ☐ Reduced country-level engagement
- ☐ Reduced global policy or normative engagement
- ☐ Reduced oversight or accountability mechanisms
- ☐ Too early to assess
- ☐ Unable to answer
- ☐ Other, please specify

8.2.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is “Other”

Section 2.B - MDBs and capital-based IFIs [If 1.3 = International Financial Institution]

2.B.1 Which forms of financial pressure are most relevant to your institution in the current financial environment?

- ☐ Reduced donor contributions to concessional windows
- ☐ Lower replenishment expectations
- ☐ Capital constraints
- ☐ Pressure on capital adequacy
- ☐ Demand for increased lending with limited resources
- ☐ Pipeline constraints
- ☐ Increased demand from clients
- ☐ Reduced administrative budget
- ☐ Pressure to reduce staffing or operating costs
- ☐ Pressure to increase private capital mobilisation
- ☐ No significant financial pressure
- ☐ Unable to answer
- ☐ Other: [Open text]

2.B.1.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is “Other” [Optional Open Text]

2.B.2 How is the current financial environment affecting your institution's financial or operational model?

- ☐ Reduced concessional lending or grants
- ☐ Reduced pipeline for specific sectors or regions
- ☐ Increased selectivity in country or sector engagement
- ☐ Increased focus on balance sheet optimisation
- ☐ Increased reliance on financial innovation
- ☐ Increased pressure to mobilise private capital
- ☐ Increased use of programmatic or regional approaches
- ☐ Reduced administrative or staff capacity
- ☐ No significant change
- ☐ Unable to answer
- ☐ Other: [Open text]

2.B.2.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is “Other” [Optional Open Text]

Section 2.C - Trust funds, financial intermediary funds and concessional windows [If 1.3 = Concessional window or fund linked to an IFI or MDB or Trust fund / financial intermediary fund]

2.C.1 How have donor contributions changed or are expected to change?

Contribution type	Increased	Stable	Reduced	Delayed	More uncertain	Unable to answer	Not applicable
Pledges	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Paid-in contributions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Multi-year commitments	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Earmarked contributions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Flexible contributions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

2.C.1.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is “Other” [Optional Open Text]

2.C.2 Has the current environment affected how resources are allocated?

- ☐ Fewer grants or allocations
- ☐ Smaller grants or allocations
- ☐ Delayed approvals
- ☐ More stringent prioritisation
- ☐ More concentration on fewer countries or themes
- ☐ Increased use of performance-based allocation
- ☐ Increased focus on co-financing or leveraging
- ☐ No significant change
- ☐ Unable to answer
- ☐ Other: [Open text]

2.C.2.a Additional details in response to the previous question, including if answer is “Other” [Optional Open Text]

2.C.3 Please describe any effects on implementing partners, recipient countries, local actors or downstream delivery.

Section 2.D - Vertical Funds [If 1.3. = Vertical fund or Global or multi-stakeholder partnership]

2.D.1 How is the current funding environment affecting your replenishment, pledge or contribution outlook?

Area	Positive	Stable	Moderately negative	Severely negative	Too early to assess	Not applicable	Unable to answer
Total pledges	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Paid-in contributions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Predictability	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Flexibility of funding	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Country allocations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Partner technical support	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

2.D.2 How are governance bodies or partnership mechanisms guiding prioritisation under the current funding environment? Please indicate whether decisions are based on need, performance, country demand, co-financing, comparative advantage or any other criteria. [Open text]

Section 3.B - Organisations responding to Humanitarian Crises / If 1.4 = yes

3.B.1 Please rank humanitarian response sectors most affected by funding cuts to your organisation

- ☐ Camp Coordination and Camp Management
- ☐ Food security
- ☐ Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH)
- ☐ Early Recovery
- ☐ Health
- ☐ Protection
- ☐ Education
- ☐ Emergency telecommunications (system-wide common services)
- ☐ Logistics (system-wide common services)
- ☐ Nutrition
- ☐ Shelter
- ☐ Not applicable
- ☐ Unable to answer

3.B.1.a Additional details in response to the previous question [open text]

3.B.2 Please rank operational or functional capacities most affected by funding cuts to your organisation

- ☐ Surge / rapid-response capacity
- ☐ Emergency procurement
- ☐ Field presence and humanitarian access
- ☐ Needs assessment and analysis
- ☐ Humanitarian coordination
- ☐ Information management
- ☐ Accountability-to-affected-populations mechanisms
- ☐ Preparedness and anticipatory action
- ☐ Civil-military coordination / humanitarian access negotiation
- ☐ Not applicable
- ☐ Unable to answer

3.B.2.a Additional details in response to the previous question [Open text]

2.B.3 How has your organisation reprioritised humanitarian or crisis-response activities?

Measure	Increased	Reduced	No change	Not Applicable	Unable to answer
Focus on life-saving activities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Focus on most severe needs	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Focus on most affected communities / geographical areas	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Assistance value / quantity per beneficiary	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Use of cash and voucher assistance	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Preparedness work / Anticipatory action	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Resilience work	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Volume of funding to local and national actors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Proportion of programmes delivered by partners	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

3.B.3.a For each measure where you registered a change, please indicate its main purpose.

Measure	Strategic prioritisation	Alignment with the Humanitarian Reset / UN80 Initiative	Cost-cutting measure	A combination	Other, please specify below
Choice A	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Choice B	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

3.B.4 Are you withdrawing from any function, sector or geography that you believe no other actor is positioned to cover?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Too early to assess
☐ Unable to answer

3.B.4.a 3.B.4.a. If yes, please provide additional details. [Open text]

3.B.5 How has your organisation's engagement with humanitarian pooled funds (CERF, country-based pooled funds) changed?

- ☐ Increased reliance on pooled funds as bilateral / earmarked funding contracts
☐ Reduced access to, or allocations from, pooled funds
☐ No significant change
☐ Not applicable
☐ Unable to answer

3.B.6 Humanitarian reform initiatives – including the Humanitarian Reset and, for UN organisations, the UN80 New Humanitarian Compact – are pursuing change across several areas. For each area, please indicate how your organisation's current trajectory relates to it. [one response per row]

Reform area	Advancing through deliberate reform	Maintaining	Scaling back as a result of funding cuts	Not applicable
Prioritisation and planning (sharper prioritisation; simplified, shorter needs and response plans; community-defined priorities)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Coordinated and principled delivery (leaner coordination and clusters; accountability to affected people; cash)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Devolution and localisation (empowered country leadership; equitable partnerships; financing to local actors)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Defending principles (humanitarian principles and IHL; protection; preventing SEA/SH; humanitarian diplomacy)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Shared services and system efficiency (pooled logistics, procurement and common services; shared data and platforms)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Role clarity and complementarity (defining your distinct role in relation to UN, INGOs and local actors; aligning mandates to reduce overlap)	☐	☐	☐	☐

3.B.6.a Additional details in response to the previous question [open text]

