

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

SEPTEMBER 2026



INTRODUCING THE ICRC

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the founding institution of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and an organisation with a unique mandate under the Geneva Conventions. Founded in 1863 in Geneva, the ICRC is formally charged under the Geneva Conventions (ratified by 196 states) with protecting and assisting victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence, and with promoting respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Unlike other organisations assessed by MOPAN, the ICRC's mandate, access, and authority derive directly from binding international humanitarian law, rather than from an intergovernmental agreement establishing and governing the organisation. The ICRC functions as guardian of IHL, engaging governments, armed forces and non-state armed groups on compliance with the laws of armed conflict, while protecting and providing humanitarian assistance to victims, including in contexts that are difficult for most international humanitarian actors to access.

The ICRC operates under the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. As the Movement's founding institution, the ICRC has some statutory responsibilities, including recognising new National Societies and



Waingmaw, Myanmar

An ICRC team holds an awareness session on the risks of contamination by weapons and safe behaviors to adopt, for displaced communities.

Photo: © Aw Hpag Ndawng | ICRC

upholding and promoting the Fundamental Principles. It sees neutrality as not a passive stance but as an operational asset that enables the ICRC to maintain dialogue with approximately 60% of around 450 armed groups globally and to operate across front lines in contexts where few other international actors are present. The organisation is distinct from UN agencies, International Finance Institutions, Vertical Funds, Partnerships and traditional I/NGOs. It is a self-governing Swiss association whose Assembly, comprising 15-25 co-opted Swiss nationals (plus the President and VP), sets the institutional strategy and provides oversight. Its current Institutional Strategy (2024-27) is organised around eight orientations, five focused on humanitarian relevance and impact, and three on organisational fitness.

With 15 889 staff (93% deployed in the field in 63 delegations and missions covering over 90 countries), the ICRC is a direct implementer at scale. Its operations are funded entirely by voluntary contributions. Governments and the European Commission provided 85% of the CHF 1.736 billion received in 2025. The ICRC applies a “plan-implement-fund” model, meaning programming decisions are driven by assessed humanitarian need rather than available funding. This architecture is in place to preserve impartiality but exposes the organisation to structural cash-flow risk.

THE ICRC'S TRAJECTORY OVER THE ASSESSMENT PERIOD

This assessment examines the period covered by the ICRC's 2024-27 Institutional Strategy, while drawing on relevant trends since 2022-23. It is the first MOPAN assessment of the ICRC and can serve as the baseline against which to measure progress if future ones take place.

The assessment period has been defined by a sharply deteriorating global conflict landscape and a collapse in humanitarian funding. A record number of armed conflicts was reported in 2024,¹ with conflict-related fatalities rising to 239 000, the highest annual total in recent decades.² Alongside a steady accumulation of simultaneous conflicts and crises, global humanitarian finance plummeted from a peak of USD 26.81 billion in 2023 to USD 14.85 billion in 2025.³ The funding collapse has catalysed a fundamental debate about the future architecture of humanitarian action. The 2025 Humanitarian Reset, led by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the UN80 reform initiative have put questions of system efficiency, localisation and the role of principled independent actors at the centre of international policy discussions. These multilateral reform efforts have direct implications for the ICRC's operating model in pursuit of its mandate and shape the context in which this assessment's findings and considerations should be read. The ICRC entered the second half of its strategy period at a moment of severely contracting financial resources across its largest operational regions.

The global decline in humanitarian funding came fast on the heels of the ICRC's own financial crisis in 2022-23. At the end of 2022, the ICRC had a CHF 117 million deficit, driven by reduced donor funding, inflation and insufficient cash-flow risk management. The planned budget of 2023 had to be drastically reduced due not only to that deficit, but also to the realisation of a CHF 380 million shortfall for 2023. These impacts combined to trigger a contraction in ICRC staff levels of approximately 1 800 positions (a 14% reduction), the closure of 26 field structures, and the scaling-back of operations across multiple delegations in 2023. The organisation's response included the elevation of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) position to Directorate level, real-time financial monitoring, a revised treasury policy and an enhanced Financial Oversight Board. With these reforms, the ICRC achieved surpluses of CHF 311 million and CHF 291 million in 2023 and 2024 respectively at consolidated level. The structural funding challenge nevertheless persists: in 2025, the ICRC had a CHF 113 million deficit at consolidated level, in the external context of a more than 50% cut in US aid spending and significant aid reductions by most other traditional donors that year. The ICRC is reducing

1. Palik, J., Rustad, S.A. and Tollefsen, A.F., 2025. Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946-2024. *PRIO Paper*. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), available at: prio.org; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2024. *International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Digging deeper*. Geneva: ICRC. Available at: icrc.org

2. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), cited in *The Washington Post*, “Data shows global conflict surged in 2024” (2025) [link](#)

3. OECD/DAC, April 2026, A historic decline in foreign aid: Preliminary 2025 ODA data link



Southern Burundi, Burunga province

Musenyi, a refugee camp hosting people from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The ICRC and the Burundi Red Cross are working to restore family links at an ICRC connectivity center, serving Congolese refugees.

Photo:
© Hugh Cunningham
Kinsella | ICRC

its budget with a further 16.9% in 2026. It is not alone: a system-wide mapping of 31 multilateral organisations by MOPAN in 2025 found that 77% of major UN agencies announced deep budget shortfalls, with the humanitarian and health sectors disproportionately affected.⁴

Of particular long-term concern is the erosion of respect for IHL in several contemporary conflicts. Growing non-compliance by parties to conflict risks weakening the normative framework within which the ICRC operates and may affect the organisation's ability to deliver on its mandate. The extent to which the ICRC can adapt its operating model, maintain access and influence, and continue to promote respect for IHL in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment will be an important factor in determining its performance in the coming years.

The 2024-27 Institutional Strategy, and the leadership transition to a new Director-General (from April 2024), represent a deliberate effort to stabilise and modernise the organisation. The current strategy is built around “a determination to centre on what lies at the heart of ICRC’s mandate”, with the belief that clarity of focus is the best way to prepare for meaningful impact. The strategy’s distinctive feature is that it elevates enabling functions (financial resilience, digital transformation, people and culture) to the level of strategic orientations alongside humanitarian delivery priorities, signalling a recognition that institutional effectiveness is inseparable from operational impact. The first implementation phase (2024-25) included the launch of a Global IHL Initiative,⁵ investments in staff recruitment and onboarding redesign. The deliberate return to a generalist (polyvalent) delegate model, reversing a period of proliferating specialist roles, has been welcomed at field level as improving integrated programming and clearer mandate communication.

ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

The ICRC is a credible, principled and field resilient organisation. Stakeholders consistently highlighted the ICRC’s ability to sustain humanitarian operations in some of the world’s most dangerous and inaccessible contexts as one of its defining strengths. Its own financial crisis in 2022-23 was a turning point: the robust institutional response, while painful, has resulted in significant governance, financial management and organisational reforms. Stakeholders

4. Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) 2025, *Mapping of Multilateral Organisations’ Response to the Current Funding Environment, Multilateral Effectiveness in a Shifting Landscape*, MOPAN, Paris, [link](#)

5. The Global Initiative to Galvanize Political Commitment to International Humanitarian Law was launched on 27 September 2024 by Brazil, China, France, Jordan, Kazakhstan and South Africa, together with the ICRC. The initiative seeks to develop concrete and actionable recommendations across seven thematic workstreams, culminating in a High-Level Conference on Humanity in War in 2026. [Link](#)

Nakivale camp, Uganda

The ICRC and the Uganda Red Cross are working together in one of Africa's oldest refugee camps to reconnect families separated by conflict and forced displacement, providing essential support and hope for reunification.

Photo: © Jamateo Aramillo | ICRC



consistently credit this recovery as evidence of meaningful institutional learning. The challenge ahead is to sustain that quality with significantly fewer resources, in an era of an unprecedented number of conflicts globally and funding contraction.⁶ The ICRC's governance reforms and liquidity position place it in a comparatively resilient position relative to many other organisations working in the humanitarian space, but the pressures facing the humanitarian system are exceptional in scale and unlikely to ease in the near term.

Across the MOPAN framework, the ICRC's performance reflects the strengths of a clear, legally grounded mandate under the Geneva Conventions and a distinctive operating model. At the same time, the assessment reveals structural vulnerabilities, above all in funding stability and results measurement, that require sustained attention to maintain pace with external changes. The relationship with National Societies and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies remains intrinsic to how the organisation views its global network and how it engages both at the global policy level and local levels. A clear division of responsibilities is set out within the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement under the Movement's Statutes. However, there is scope for the ICRC and its Movement partners to leverage the Movement's combined presence in a more systematic manner, particularly in transition and recovery contexts. As a localised operating model becomes increasingly important across the humanitarian sector, the ICRC faces the challenge of maximising the value of its Movement partnerships (particularly with National Societies) while preserving the direct operational presence that underpins its mandate and access to conflict-affected populations.

A credible, principled and field resilient organisation

A key source of the ICRC's comparative advantage as a humanitarian organisation is its combination of a clear legal mandate, a principled operating model, and a unique role in promoting respect for IHL that is recognised in the Geneva Conventions. Its neutrality enables access to populations and engagement with parties to a conflict⁷ that other international humanitarian actors are often not able to reach. Its principled model is deeply embedded at all levels of the organisation, operationalised through training, institutional culture and robust guidance on humanitarian principles in practice. The assessment rates the ICRC's strategic management as strong, with a well-grounded strategy, effective governance and deeply internalised humanitarian principles. It has reinvigorated its IHL

6. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program recorded 61 active state-based conflicts in 2024, the highest number since records began in 1946 (Davies, S., Pettersson, T., Sollenberg, M. and Öberg, M. 2025 "Organized violence 1989–2024, and the challenges of identifying civilian victims", *Journal of Peace Research*, 62(4), pp. 1223–1240. [Link](#)) while total conflict fatalities rose from 188 000 in 2023 to 239 000 in 2024 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI, 2025 SIPRI Yearbook 2025, Chapter 2: Armed Conflict and Conflict Management. [Link](#))

7. 'Parties to the conflict' is a term used in International Humanitarian Law to denote any state or organised non-state group engaged in hostilities, regardless of the group's official recognition.

normative role through the Global IHL Initiative (a collaborative effort with states designed to galvanise political commitment and develop practical recommendations to strengthen respect for the rules of war), expanded dialogue on autonomous weapons, cyber warfare and AI, and the 75th Geneva Conventions anniversary platform, reflecting its distinctive mandate and comparative advantage. This institutional strength is a significant asset as the ICRC enters the second half of its strategy period at a time of expanding conflict and contracting global funding.

The 2022-23 crisis was an institutional turning point

The ICRC's substantive response to its 2022-23 financial crisis has rendered the organisation significantly sharper and better governed in 2026 than it was three years ago. The surpluses generated in 2023 and 2024, the ability to maintain flexible funding at around 45.5% in 2025, and markedly improved donor transparency together reflect genuine institutional improvement. The cumulative workforce reduction (from a peak of 22 488 staff in 2022 to 15 889 by May 2026) carries material risks to institutional memory, succession planning and technical capacity that will require active management. Its operational management is effective, although there are some gaps in value-for-money evidence and uneven operationalisation of scale-up trigger mechanisms. Structural vulnerabilities persist: over the past three years (2023-25), an average of 85% of contributions came from governments and the European Commission. In 2025, the top five donors alone provided 52% of all ICRC funding. While reliance on state funding remains high, the proportion of funding from private sources rose sharply from around 4% in 2021 to about 13% in 2023, fell back to roughly 8% in 2024, and was up again at 12% in 2025, caused by both increases in private funding and governments scaling back contributions.

The ICRC's comparatively strong governance reforms and liquidity reserves provide meaningful near-term resilience against the broader system-wide funding contraction described above, but they do not insulate the organisation from a structural shift in the global ODA environment that is unlikely to reverse in the medium term. The ICRC has also refocused on its core mission in the face of funding cuts. In a funding environment where it needs to "do less, with less", it is operating with greater focus, efficiency and institutional clarity. It has re-centred on its humanitarian mandate, with a focus on emergency response and moving away from resilience programming to systems resilience delivered in protracted crises and development-adjacent contexts.

Strong field delivery, with scope for further partnership

With most of its staff concentrated in the field and strong conflict sensitivity practice, the ICRC's relationship management and programming are effective. Of stakeholders surveyed, 85% viewed the quality of country-level decision-making as strong. As the founding institution of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the ICRC operates a Movement-first philosophy, in which National Societies are intended to be primary partners in planning, implementation and accountability rather than simply delivery vehicles. Interviews, particularly at delegation level, suggest that in some contexts the relationship between the ICRC and National Societies is perceived as a predominantly project-driven and operational (or, as they describe it, "transactional") relationship. While National Societies' capacity strengthening is within the IFRC's mandate, the ICRC supports their institutional strengthening and emergency preparedness and response. The 2022 refreshed Seville Agreement 2.0 sets out the principles for operational and functional collaboration between the Movement components and works to clarify the role of National Societies as stronger convenors, when the context allows, although there is greater potential of the Movement as a force multiplier.

Relationships with National Societies are perceived to remain largely at field level, and localisation commitments have not yet been translated into concrete operational shifts or multi-year funding to partners (noting that the ICRC itself receives 80% of its funding annually, and of the multi-year funding it receives only half is unearmarked).⁸

8. The ICRC has committed to "actively participating in thought-leadership on localisation and decolonisation of aid". Source: ICRC, "ICRC launches 2024-2027 institutional strategy," 2023, available at [link](#); see also ICRC, *Institutional Strategy 2024-2027*, strategic orientation 5 ("A new humanitarianism for a changing world"). The strategy's fifth orientation commits the ICRC to strengthening local partnerships and to engaging at the most local level with affected communities to design responses together with them, while building on its practice of partnering with local institutions.

Substantial output-level results are reported, but significant outcomes remain under-measured and under-reported, constrained by the sensitive nature of the ICRC's mandate

The overall finding on the ICRC's results is one of substantial output-level achievements, constrained by structural factors inherent to the mandate: the confidentiality requirements that limit what can be measured and reported, and the methodological challenge of capturing the value of normative and preventive work.

Outcome- and impact-level evidence, particularly for protection and prevention programming, remains limited due to structural and methodological constraints. While the ICRC notes that considerable efforts are underway, it has not yet developed a credible and systematic methodology for measuring and demonstrating the value of some of its most significant contributions. This challenge has persisted across the assessment period, as explored in detail under KPI 8 (monitoring systems) of the MOPAN assessment framework. The organisation's most significant humanitarian outcomes, grounded in its mandate and legal authority, are structurally under-reported in results reporting due to the operational confidentiality that makes the ICRC's work possible: these include preventing violations of IHL through confidential dialogue, securing access through principled relationship-building with armed parties, and facilitating prisoner releases as a neutral intermediary. The Analysis and Evidence function and the new Evaluation Office are important investments, but neither has yet resolved this performance reporting gap.

Output reporting shows strong achievements, with output targets met or exceeded in most areas and an implementation rate of 88% in 2025 (up by 1% from 2024). To illustrate the wide range of the ICRC's recorded results achievements, in 2025, it facilitated 1.46 million phone calls between separated family members, visited 678 337 detainees, reached 3.09 million people with food security support and supported 669 hospitals.⁹

Some areas continue to require attention: Community-accessible reporting and complaint mechanisms on sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH), remain inconsistent at field level despite strong policy frameworks at headquarters; a dedicated whistleblower protection policy is not yet in place.

The central challenge ahead is sustaining the quality of delivery across all dimensions as the organisation absorbs a further 16.9% budget reduction in 2026, in an era of an unprecedented number of conflicts and a structural contraction in the global humanitarian funding environment.

NOTABLE ICRC PRACTICES

- **The “plan-implement-fund” model:** programming driven by humanitarian need rather than available funding, this model is designed to preserve programmatic integrity and impartiality. As evidenced by the 2022-23 crisis, this model requires robust liquidity management and strong financial governance to function sustainably.
- **The ICRC's engagement with armed non-state actors:** The ICRC reported dialogue with around 60% of the 450 armed groups it identified as being of humanitarian concern globally in 2024. The ICRC has built a principled, structured framework over decades, grounded in its mandated role under the Geneva Conventions, which other actors are not in a position to replicate.
- **The Analysis and Evidence function:** while relatively new (established four years ago), it has the potential for institutional innovation, integrating Geographic Information System (GIS) capacity, protection evidence frameworks and outcome-monitoring data into one common programme cycle methodology.
- **The recent strengthening of the independent evaluation function,** with the establishment of an Evaluation Office: while reporting directly to the Director-General, the Evaluation Office has programme discretion and is developing into a strong entity for institutional learning, positively noted by stakeholders.

9. ICRC, *Annual Report 2025*, [link](#), p.18

- **Transparency:** The ICRC's donors describe the organisation's donor engagement as more proactive and open since the 2023 financial crisis. Members of the Donor Support Group (DSG) praised the thematic DSG fora as a model of accountable relationship management.

MAIN STRENGTHS AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Main strengths

- The Geneva Conventions mandate provides the ICRC with a distinctive role and operational access in armed conflict that no other humanitarian organisation has. The mandate's anchor in neutrality, impartiality and independence sustains the trust that the ICRC's delivery of mandated tasks depends on. Confidential protection, IHL prevention and access brokering sit at the core, and dialogue with multiple armed groups globally reaches populations others cannot. A reinvigorated IHL role on autonomous weapons, cyber and AI keeps the treaty-based mandate current.
- Post-crisis reforms have restored financial solvency and strengthened financial resilience. With 30-45% of contributions unearmarked or loosely earmarked, well above sector norms, and donor engagement that includes well-received DSG forums, the ICRC protects both rapid-response capability and flexible funding.
- The 2024-27 strategy sets clear priorities under tight resources, and the return to a generalist delegate model has sharpened programming and country-level decision-making.
- The Analysis and Evidence function and an independent Evaluation Office are strengthening evidence-based programming and safeguard learning in ways many peers lack, while the post-2022 IT overhaul has diminished cybersecurity risk and built a base for future digital investment.

Areas for improvement

- Dependence on a handful of government donors is an acute vulnerability, exposed by 2025 budget reductions and a further 16.9% reduction for 2026, during a particularly challenging external operating environment. Limited public visibility of the ICRC's results in pursuing its core protection mandate constrains both influence and the scope to diversify beyond traditional government donors.
- The ICRC still cannot fully measure or communicate the outcomes of some of its most important work. Efforts are underway, but gaps persist, and uneven digital transformation, field tools, and analytics limit monitoring and accountability.
- Workforce cuts since 2023 have eroded institutional memory and are affecting surge capacity and morale.
- The traction with and quality of reporting against PSEAH policy implementation at delegation level varies.
- There is no dedicated whistleblower protection policy and the willingness to report misconduct depends on the culture of openness and trust within each delegation.
- Evidence from the interviews at delegation level suggests that National Society relationships are in some contexts predominantly delivery and project-driven, with challenges in governance and resilience to sustain response where ICRC operations are contracting. The 2024-27 Institutional Strategy's broader localisation commitments have yet to translate into operational shifts or multi-year partner funding; without these, the Movement's ability to realise its potential as a force multiplier remains constrained.


ICRC in numbers

INSTITUTIONAL LEADS

Belgium and the Netherlands

Overview

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a humanitarian organisation founded in Geneva, Switzerland in 1863; it is 82 years older than the United Nations. Its mandate is formally rooted in the Geneva Conventions, which charge it with protecting and assisting victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence, and with promoting respect for and implementation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This legal foundation grants the ICRC a distinct authority and legitimacy to operate in conflict settings where access is often restricted for other actors.



CONTRIBUTIONS BY SOURCE, 2022-24

Source	2022 (CHF m)	% 2022	2023 (CHF m)	% 2023	2024 (CHF m)	% 2024	2025 (CHF m)	% 2025
Governments	1 820	71.4%	1 811	74.9%	1 683	82.7%	1 343	77.4%
European Commission	151	5.9%	164	6.8%	142	7.0%	132	4.6%
Private Sources	337	13.2%	314	13.0%	167	8.2%	204	11.8%
National Societies	221	8.8%	48	2.1%	20	1.0%	24	1.4%
Other (supranational / public)	22	0.7%	81	3.3%	26	1.1%	33	1.9%
TOTAL	2 553	100%	2 418	100%	2 038	100%	1 736	100%

Source: ICRC

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

The ICRC enters the second half of its 2024-27 strategy period navigating converging pressures: a contracting funding environment, an expanding humanitarian needs landscape, a fragmenting geopolitical order, and profound questions about the future of the international humanitarian system. The following seven considerations are addressed to ICRC senior management, MOPAN members, Donor Support Group (DSG) members and wider ICRC stakeholders. They reflect the assessment team's judgement on the most strategically significant issues for the near and medium term.

CONSIDERATION 1: Urgently diversify donors

The significant global reduction of aid funding from traditional donors in 2025 exposed the ICRC's reliance on a small number of government donors. The 2026 mid-strategy review is a natural moment to bring revised diversification targets before the Assembly. MOPAN members and the ICRC's DSG should expect and facilitate time-bound progress on: Gulf, Asia and Latin America donor engagement; private sector fundraising; and multi-year flexible commitments.

CONSIDERATION 2: Invest in capturing and communicating the value of protection outcomes

Not all the ICRC's most distinctive humanitarian contributions are systematically represented in its results architecture. This gap affects its ability to demonstrate value to donors, defend its cost structure against efficiency demands, and contribute evidence to sector-wide debates about what "good" humanitarian performance looks like. The ICRC's Analysis and Evidence function should be tasked with developing methodologies for documenting preventive outcomes and the impact of confidential engagement. MOPAN members should be prepared to provide patient, flexible funding to support this investment, recognising that measurement of the ICRC's most significant impacts is challenging and will require methodological innovation.

CONSIDERATION 3: Develop and resource a human capital strategy that can balance the dual pressures of further budget cuts and strategic talent demands

The cumulative impact of workforce reductions since 2022 creates material risks to operational capacity, institutional memory and staff wellbeing. Priorities include the following: active knowledge management at senior delegation level; mental health and psychosocial support infrastructure; and targeted acquisition of digital and data talent.

CONSIDERATION 4: Accelerate digital transformation with explicit attention to its implications for data protection in conflict settings

The digital transformation agenda is well-founded, with tangible progress, but remains operationally uneven. Field staff report inadequate tools, connectivity and inter-operability of systems. The ICRC handles some of the most sensitive personal data in the humanitarian sector. The 2026 budget review is an opportunity to ring-fence digital transformation and data protection investments from efficiency cuts across the board.

CONSIDERATION 5: Strengthen the Movement partnership model as a force multiplier for capacity and reach in an era of constrained resources

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement represents an underutilised asset in an era of resource constraints. National Society relationships in operational contexts are often perceived to be vertical and focused on direct implementation and delivery rather than genuinely collaborative. The Directorate should develop, in consultation with National Societies and the IFRC, a concrete plan for deepening equitable partnership in the operational contexts most affected by the 2026 budget reductions.

CONSIDERATION 6: Engage substantively in the Humanitarian Reset and system-wide reform agenda from a position of principle and influence

The 2025 Humanitarian Reset and the UN80 initiative constitute significant structural reform processes for the humanitarian system. Their focus on effectiveness, localisation, streamlining co-ordination, reducing bureaucracy and protecting life-saving action is in close alignment with the ICRC's core institutional characteristics, including

its principled independence from UN structures, its comparative advantage in direct implementation, and its commitments to localisation. The ICRC's de-prioritisation of nexus and recovery activities raises important questions about whether and how needs previously addressed through these approaches will be met by other actors. As these reform processes evolve, the ICRC has a key institutional role in ensuring that considerations of IHL and principled humanitarian action remain central to system-wide reforms, informed by its mandate and by its operational experience in securing humanitarian access and protecting civilians.

CONSIDERATION 7: Use the 2026 mid-strategy review to integrate MOPAN assessment findings into institutional adaptation

The 2024-27 Institutional Strategy's first implementation phase concluded in 2025. The 2026 mid-point review provides an opportunity to integrate the findings of this MOPAN assessment (the first in the ICRC's history) into the organisation's change management process. MOPAN members and the Assembly should expect: (i) a transparent assessment of progress against each of the eight strategic orientations; (ii) explicit acknowledgement of the areas for improvement identified in this report; (iii) revised, credible targets for funding diversification and results measurement; and (iv) a management response to this assessment's considerations that is time-bound and tracked. For the DSG, the mid-strategy review is also an opportunity to align members' bilateral dialogue with the ICRC around the shared priorities identified in this report, reducing fragmentation and increasing the coherence of the donor engagement that remains the ICRC's primary source of financial and political support.

METHODOLOGY

This assessment applies the MOPAN 3.1 Adapted Methodology for MOs working in crisis-affected contexts, further adapted during the inception phase to reflect the ICRC's distinct legal status, mandate and operating principles¹⁰. Key adaptations include: reframing cross-cutting issue indicators to reflect IHL rather than development and 2030 Agenda commitments; removing the IDP indicator, since IDPs are amongst civilian populations that the ICRC responds to; adapting governance indicators to reflect the ICRC's Swiss civil law Assembly; merging sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and sexual harassment (SH) indicators into a unified SEAH indicator; and adapting partnership and results indicators to reflect the ICRC's direct-implementation model and Movement-first partnership philosophy. Full framework adaptations are in Annex A.

The assessment covers 12 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) across five performance areas:


- **Strategic Management** (KPIs 1–2),
- **Operational Management** (KPIs 3–4),
- **Relationship Management** (KPIs 5–6),
- **Performance Management** (KPIs 7–8) and
- **Results** (KPIs 9–12).

KPIs 1–8 are scored at element level (0–4 scale, averaged to micro-indicator (MI) and KPI level). KPIs 9–12 are based on meta-analysis of evaluation evidence and performance reporting.

The overall assessment relied on three evidence streams: a document review (500 documents, cut-off December 2025; with select key information updated into Spring 2026), a stakeholder survey (17 November – 17 December 2025, distributed in English, French and Spanish, covering ten country/regional sample contexts), and 190+ ICRC staff engaged at HQ (81), and at delegations level (excluding South Sudan) (42) and external stakeholders (70), including a country visit to South Sudan (November 2025). Chapter 4 of the main report describes the methodology in greater detail.


10. MOPAN Adapted Framework for MOs working in Crises, MOPAN, [link](#)

ICRC SCORING OVERVIEW




Note: The 2026 MOPAN assessment of ICRC was undertaken using the MOPAN 3.1 assessment methodology.

How to read these charts



Key Performance Indicator



ABOUT MOPAN

The Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN) comprises 20 members¹¹ that promote an effective multilateral system, trusted to deliver solutions to evolving global goals and local challenges.

MOPAN is a network of members who assess multilateral organisations, shape performance standards, and champion learning and insights to strengthen development and humanitarian results and promote accountability. Capitalising on the Network's unique cross-multilateral system perspective and expertise, MOPAN members work together to deliver relevant, impartial, high-quality and timely performance information as a public good through an inclusive and transparent approach.

MOPAN's performance information mitigates risks, informs decision-making and supports change, helping increase knowledge and trust amongst all stakeholders and ultimately achieving a stronger, better-performing multilateral system.

11. As at 1 September 2026: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

For more
information



North Darfur, Sudan

With the support of the ICRC and the Sudanese Red Crescent, eight community kitchens are providing two hot meals a day to approximately 10,000 newly displaced people who have fled violent clashes that disrupted supply chains and forced tens of thousands of people to leave their homes. Photo: © Ismail Ahmed | ICRC

